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Ever since the United States was reconstituted after the Civil War, 
a Confederate narrative of states’ rights has undermined the 
Reconstruction Amendments’ design for the protection of civil rights. 
The Confederate narrative’s diminishment of civil rights has been 
regularly challenged, but it stubbornly persists. Today the narrative 
survives in imprecise and unquestioning odes to state sovereignty.  
We analyze the relationship, over time, between assertions of civil 
rights and calls for the protection of local autonomy and control. This 
analysis reveals a troubling sequence: the Confederate narrative was 
shamefully intertwined with the defense of American chattel slavery. 
It survived profound challenges raised by post-Reconstruction civil 
rights claimants and by mid-twentieth century civil rights movements. 
It reemerges regularly to pose questionable but unanswered challenges 
to calls for national protection of civil rights. Our examination of the 
Confederate narrative’s jurisprudential effects exposes an urgent need 
to address the consequential but under-recognized tension between 
human and civil rights in the United States on the one hand and local 
autonomy on the other. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Two narratives of our country’s post-bellum Reconstruction have 
figured importantly in Supreme Court deliberations about civil rights: 
a Confederate narrative1 and a People’s narrative. The Confederate 
narrative is a story in which the states’ reunion after the Civil War 
was a modest reform by which state-sanctioned slavery was ended, 
but states’ rights were virtually unaffected. It is a story grounded in 
the assumption that People’s rights are best protected by limiting 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 1. We use the word “Confederate” deliberately though we recognize it may 
provoke unease. By stating that certain modern Court decisions continue the 
Confederate narrative, we are not arguing that particular Justices or supporters of 
particular opinions embrace the racist ideology of the historical Confederacy. We 
recognize the value of principled defenses of decentralized enforcement power when 
they are based on careful and context-specific thought about the optimal or just 
allocation of particular kinds of civil rights decision-making authority. See, e.g., 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice 10 (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory, Working Paper No. 114, 2009) (arguing that decentralization can improve 
political “voice”); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Towards a Universal Field Theory of 
National Private Rights and Federalism, 76 MONT. L. REV. 41, 52 (2015). We worry, 
however, about uncritical adherence to the belief that decentralization of government 
power is, in itself, an enhancement of the people’s liberty. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012). 
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federal power and protecting the power and independence of states. 
The People’s narrative is one in which the nation rejected both slavery 
and its assault on human dignity and altered its slavery-tolerating 
Constitution to give the federal government power to protect the 
People’s rights. It is a story involving guarantees of national 
citizenship and national protection of citizens’ equal rights. 
The states’ rights presumption underlying the Confederate 
narrative has innocent sources: it echoes colonial resistance to British 
tyranny, and it is bolstered by the psychological residue of times when 
the perils of distant rule loomed large because interstate 
communication and travel were so slow and arduous that the nation 
seemed unworkably large and federal authority could seem 
unworkably remote. Yet the Confederate narrative is notoriously 
significant for having protected slave power, undermined the Civil 
War Amendments, and justified Jim Crow subordination. Indeed, it is 
now clear that under the banner of state sovereignty state 
governments were complicit in the surveillance, harassment, and 
murder of civil rights workers who dared to challenge segregation and 
white supremacy.2 Although beaten back for a while during the Civil 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 2. The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission (MSSC) (1954) and the 
Louisiana State Sovereignty Commission (LSSC) (1960) exemplify states’ persecution 
of civil rights workers under the banner of local sovereignty. Both commissions were 
reactions to federal mandates to overturn segregation, and particularly to the 1954 
and 1955 Supreme Court rulings in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 
(1954) (holding segregation of public schools unconstitutional) and Brown v. Board of 
Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (calling for desegregation “with all deliberate 
speed”). Sarah Rowe-Sims, The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission: An 
Agency History, MISSISSIPPI HISTORY NOW (Sept. 2002), http://mshistorynow. 
mdah.state.ms.us/articles/243/mississippi-sovereignty-commission-an-agency-
history. The MSSC and the LSSC espoused states’ rights, with a particular focus on 
maintaining the status quo in race relations. As an LSSC pamphlet proclaimed, 
Louisiana should “never give up in our fight for the American Way of Life” and “[didn’t] 
have to integrate [its] schools[.]” LOUISIANA STATE SOVEREIGNTY COMMISSION, DON’T 
BE BRAINWASHED: WE DON’T HAVE TO INTEGRATE OUR SCHOOLS! (1960), available at 
http://cds.library.brown.edu/projects/Freedom 
Now/do_search_single.php?searchid=10061. Sovereignty Commissions and similar 
bodies invoked the illegitimacy of federal control to downplay the salience of white 
supremacist ideologies. JENNY IRONS, RECONSTITUTING WHITENESS: THE MISSISSIPPI 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY COMMISSION 48 (1st ed. 2010). The MSSC characterized the Civil 
Rights Act as “vicious and tyrannical legislation,” id. at 139, and Mississippi Governor 
James P. Coleman argued that the civil rights bills were a violation of “sound 
governmental principles” that were undermining the division of powers between the 
federal and state governments. Id. at 48. The act creating the MSSC gave the agency 
broad power to “do and perform any and all acts and things deemed necessary and 
proper to protect the sovereignty of the state of Mississippi, and her sister states” from 
“encroachment thereon by the Federal Government or any branch, department or 
agency thereof; to resist the usurpation of the rights and powers reserved to this state 
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Rights Movements of the last century, the Confederate narrative and 
its underlying assumptions about the importance of states’ rights 
persist to this day in discourse hostile to the People’s rights.3  
Although it has had a persistent influence in constitutional 
discourse, the Confederate narrative rests on a distorted reading of 
our legal history and encourages a narrow understanding of the rights 
of constitutional personhood. We therefore advance what we call the 
People’s narrative. This more historically grounded account holds that 
Reconstruction changed the constitutional balance among federal, 
state, and people power. Basic civil rights4—including the mutually 
                                                                                                                                       
 
and our sister states by the Federal Government or any branch, department or agency 
thereof.” Rowe-Sims, supra. Using these broad powers, the MSSC “engaged in 
wiretapping, bugging, and other acts of espionage against Mississippi citizens[,]” 
ultimately collecting “dossiers on ‘approximately 250 organizations’ and . . . ‘about 
10,000 individual[s.]’” JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI 60 (1994). With that information, the MSSC’s agents 
penetrated the major civil rights organizations, informed police about planned 
marches or boycotts, encouraged police harassment of African-Americans who 
cooperated with civil rights groups, obstructed African-American voter registration, 
and harassed African-Americans seeking to attend white schools. SPIES OF 
MISSISSIPPI (PBS television broadcast Feb. 10, 2014), 
http://proxy.lib.utk.edu:90/login?url=http://fod.infobase.com/PortalPlaylists.aspx?wID
=98092&xtid=58663 (access available upon request). 
There is evidence that the MSSC was linked to both attempted and executed 
assassinations. See Kevin Sack, Mississippi Reveals Dark Secrets of a Racist Time, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar 18, 1998, at A1 (describing an MSSC memorandum indicating 
MSSC’s capacity to arrange the murder of Clyde Kennard, a black man who tried to 
desegregate Mississippi Southern College.); Phillip Abbott Luce, The Mississippi 
White Citizens Council: 1954-1959, at 90 (1960) (unpublished M.A. thesis, The Ohio 
State University) (on file at https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession 
=osu1144847499&disposition=inline) (describing MSSC involvement in the shooting 
of Gus Courts, a black man who refused to withdraw his name from the rolls of 
registered voters, the assassination of Reverend George Lee, a black voter registration 
activist, and the lynching of Mack Charles Parker, a black man awaiting trial for the 
rape of a white woman); Dr. Horace Germany’s Sacrifice–1960-2010, 
NEWSWIREHOUSTON (Sept. 1, 2000), http://newswirehouston.com/dr-horace-
germany%E2%80%99s-sacrifice-1960-2010/ (describing an MSSC plan to “kill [a white 
minister attempting to establish a seminary for black students] and scatter that so-
called Bible College to the wind.”); see also, Sarah Rowe-Sims & David Pilcher, 
Processing the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Records, 21 THE PRIMARY 
SOURCE 15, 18–23 (1999) (describing the 1977 class action suit that resulted in the 
opening of the MSSC’s files); Louisiana State Sovereignty Commission, CIVIL RIGHTS 
DIGITAL LIBRARY (Dec. 30, 2016), http://crdl.usg.edu/export/html/mus 
/sovcomfolders/crdl_mus_sovcomfolders_99-104-0.html?Welcome (compiling records 
collected by the MSSC from correspondence with the LSSC between 1963 and 1967).  
 3. Contemporary Supreme Court cases that advance the Confederate narrative 
(wittingly or unwittingly) are examined infra in Part IV. 
 4. We use the term “civil rights” to include both entitlements specified in the 
Bill of Rights (like the right of free speech or religious choice) and entitlements (like 
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reinforcing rights to be accommodated in public places, to be educated, 
and to participate in the nation’s political life—became privileges of 
the People, and the federal government became the ultimate judge 
and protector of those rights. 
The Founders’ accommodation to human chattel slavery 
problematized the delineation of human rights. As we will show 
below, the Confederate insistence on local control has been used to 
justify slavery, Jim Crow subordination and toleration of the 
subordination of women and sexual minorities.5 Union victory in the 
Civil War and Reconstruction might have established the primacy of 
human rights over local control. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments and no fewer than five Reconstruction-Era 
Civil Rights Acts declared the People’s rights and gave the federal 
government power to protect them. Yet as federal authority was 
asserted, the Confederate narrative was reasserted to valorize local 
control, and Reconstruction was undone.6 As historian David Blight 
has brilliantly shown, the excited post-war celebration of 
emancipation and of newfound hope for a more egalitarian Union 
were replaced over time by shock over the war’s carnage and 
persisting belief in white supremacy.7 As a result, the South was 
redeemed, and the nation was left with a dominant memory of 
principled and valiant brothers ending a painful misunderstanding 
with mutual respect and ponderous questions about the optimal 
balance of state and federal power.8 In most of white America, 
enthusiasm for freedom and equality was lost.9 
The Confederate narrative’s underlying assumptions about 
history and the proper balance of sovereign power were not effectively 
challenged again until the 1960s. During the 1960s, civil rights 
protesters renewed the Reconstruction effort to transform popular 
and official discourse about power and rights.10 They challenged the 
dominant dichotomous view that only two powers count when it comes 
                                                                                                                                       
 
an individual’s right of personal integrity, family autonomy, or public accommodation) 
that are implicit in our traditions and our commitment to republican democracy. 
 5. See infra Parts II & IV.  
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See generally DAVID BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN 
AMERICAN MEMORY 1 (2001) (providing a “history of how Americans remembered their 
most divisive and tragic experience during the fifty-year period after the Civil War”). 
 8. See id. at 2. 
 9. See id. at 3. 
 10. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Divided by Law: The Sits-Ins and the Role of 
the Courts in the Civil Rights Movement, 33 L. & HIST. L. REV. 93 (2015). 
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to rights–state versus federal.11 Civil rights protesters revived a 
passion about the people’s national citizenship that had been 
expressed by black Union soldiers when roughly 200,000 members of 
the United States Colored Troops (USCT) marched “under USCT 
numerals rather than state designations” as they and their families 
“established themselves in a new and distinctive relationship with the 
federal government.”12 Representing what civil rights activist Robert 
Moses calls the “Demand Side” of civil rights,13 civil rights protestors 
argued that both nation and state exist to protect the People’s rights 
and interests.14 The argument for the People’s place in a triangle of 
power posited the Fourteenth Amendment as a charter of people’s 
rights.15 Rejecting Confederate accounts of post-Civil War history that 
belittled the changes wrought by Reconstruction, civil rights activists 
called for strong and double-barreled interpretation of the federal and 
state governments’ simultaneous obligations to the People.16 
Although the Supreme Court often ruled in ways that were favorable 
to the cause of civil rights, the Court never came to terms with the 
contradictions between the Confederate narrative and protection of 
the People’s rights.17  
The Court’s failure to confront the Confederate narrative in the 
manner advocated by 1960s civil rights activists has been 
consequential. Confederate valorization of local control has quietly 
reemerged in our modern constitutional discourse. It has surfaced 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 11. Id. at 99 (“The student sit-in movement of 1960 was transformative on a 
number of levels. It reshaped and reinvigorated the struggle for racial equality. The 
sit-ins marked a new phase of the Civil Rights Movement, one in which mass 
participatory direct-action protest would become the leading edge of the movement's 
demand for social and political change.) 
 12. J. Matthew Gallman, Foreword to RONALD S. CODDINGTON, AFRICAN 
AMERICAN FACES OF THE CIVIL WAR: AN ALBUM, at ix, xv (2012) (suggesting that as 
the USCT “marched under the federal flag . . . their ties to the federal government 
were more explicit than those of their white comrades, who fought almost exclusively 
in state-numbered regiments.”).  
 13. Math as a Civil Rights Issue: Working the Demand Side, HARV. GAZETTE 
(May 17, 2001), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2001/05/math-as-a-civil-rights-
issue/. 
 14. Schmidt, supra note 10, at 112-13.   
 15. We borrow the concept of triangulation from Laurence H. Tribe, 
Commentary, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 957-61 (1973–74). Tribe 
emphasized the conceptual value of thinking separately but simultaneously about an 
utterance, the belief of the utterer, and the conclusion the utterance would urge. Id. 
at 958. We emphasize the conceptual value of thinking separately and simultaneously 
about the possessor of a right and the bodies responsible for defining and enforcing it. 
 16. Christopher W. Schmidt, Conceptions of Law in the Civil Rights Movement, 
1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 641 (2011). 
 17. See infra Part III. 
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with disturbingly little contestation in cases involving gender-based 
violence18 and justifying voting rights retrenchment.19 The narrative 
has framed key debates over separation of powers20 and animated 
dissent over recognizing the rights of sexual minorities.21 In each of 
these contexts, the Court has been encouraged to belittle 
Reconstruction’s significance and utter unquestioning odes to state 
sovereignty.22  
The claims set out above rest importantly on our understanding 
of the concept of narrative. Before elaborating those claims, we pause 
to explain what we mean by “narrative” and how the concept guides 
our analysis. We use the term “narrative” in its technical sense. A 
narrative features “a cast of human-like characters” interacting in a 
plot.23 Plots unfold along a timeline where “an initial steady state . . . 
[is] disrupted by a [t]rouble.” The trouble “evok[es] efforts at redress 
or transformation, which succeed or fail, . . . so that the old steady 
state is restored or a new . . . steady state is created[.]”24 Through this 
simple ordering, narratives construct meaning in a discourse: 
inexplicable events are reconstructed as straightforward stories; 
random facts are made coherent; ambiguous statements are 
reinterpreted as connected propositions.25 Narrative theory helps 
explain the discursive meaning of judicial opinions. Buried within 
judicial opinions, one can find stories with beginnings (steady states), 
middles (troubles generating responses), and ends (redress or 
transformation).26 
Viewed through a narrative lens, judicial opinions do more than 
decide concrete disputes between parties and establish abstract 
principles for deciding future cases. Opinions also rely on and advance 
narratives that help the author of, and the audience for, the decision 
to translate abstract ideas into familiar and socially resonant 
concepts. These narratives are not mere rhetorical flourishes. Long 
after the holding and precedential rule of the case have evolved, been 
overturned, or been made irrelevant by the passage of time, the 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 18. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). 
 19. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2632 (2014). 
 20. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997). 
 21. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2611–26 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 113 (2000) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 24. Id. at 113–14 (emphasis omitted). 
 25. See id. at 115 (dramatizing a story’s ability to be more than “the sheer 
transfer of information”). 
 26. See id. at 113. 
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narrative elements of the case will often retain their persuasive 
power. 
We understand the Confederate narrative as an enduring story in 
which states’ sovereignty is the steady state, federal power is the 
trouble, and squelching federal power is the happy ending. In that 
telling, states’ rights are the doctrinal lodestar or constitutional true 
north. The People’s narrative, on the other hand, is one in which 
liberty ordered by respect for national human rights norms is the 
steady state, infringement of that ordered liberty is the trouble, and 
enforcement of the norms is the happy ending. In that telling, respect 
for human dignity is the lodestar. In the sections that follow, we trace 
the alternating power of the Confederate narrative’s calls to protect 
state sovereignty and the People’s narrative’s calls to protect the 
people’s liberty as a matter of respect for human dignity.27  
As it happens, the People’s narrative has so far found its most 
fulsome expression in overlooked dissents—especially those of the 
first Justice Harlan28 and of Justice Douglas.29 Justice Douglas once 
wrote, quoting Chief Justice Hughes, that “[a] dissent in a court of last 
resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law[.]”30 Our account 
of the ebbs and flows of the Confederate and People’s narratives is 
thus an account of judicial brooding over time in majority, concurring, 
and dissenting opinions. 
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows: In Section II, we 
map the Confederate narrative’s influence on the Court’s early 
resistance to Reconstruction’s enhancement of federal power, and the 
emergence of a People’s narrative in the judicial brooding that 
resistance generated. In Section III, we trace the play of Confederate 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 27. In our quest to uncover the essential lines of the Confederate and People’s 
narratives, we have benefited from the use of a tool developed by our colleague Colin 
Starger—the SCOTUS Mapper. The Supreme Court Mapping Project, UNIV. OF BALT., 
(Dec. 13, 2016) http://law.ubalt.edu/faculty/scotus-mapping/ [hereinafter the SCOTUS 
Mapper]. This tool helps researchers discover and visually represent the influence of 
separate opinions in non-unanimous Supreme Court cases. We have mapped the 
competing lines of cases discussed in this Article using the SCOTUS Mapper. These 
maps are accessible through the interactive links infra in Appendix B or at The 
Persistence of the Confederate Narrative, IN PROGRESS, 
http://blogs.ubalt.edu/cstarger/beyond-confederate-narrative/ (last visited Jan. 21, 
2017, 9:56 PM). 
 28. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 20–38 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 29. See United States v. Williams (Williams I), 341 U.S. 70, 87 (1951) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting); United States v. Williams (Williams II), 341 U.S. 70, 92 (1951) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting). 
 30. William O. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J. AM. 
JUDICATURE SOC’Y 104, 106 (1948) (quoting Chief Justice Hughes).  
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and People’s narratives in renewed brooding over federal power that 
was triggered when 1960s civil rights activists revived antislavery 
ideologies to assert the People’s rights to public accommodation and 
political participation. Section IV examines more recent opinions and 
notes the continuing power of the Confederate narrative and the 
inexplicable silencing of the competing People’s narrative. Section V 
concludes and offers a resource for readers who wish to continue or 
critique our inquiry: an interactive “map” of significant cases, 
statutes, and events discussed in the preceding sections.31  
 
I.  RECONSTRUCTION: ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM CONCEIVED 
AND ABORTED 
The United States Supreme Court has never answered the central 
constitutional question posed by the Reconstruction Amendments: 
Did the framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments reconstruct the original constitutional order to establish 
a national charter of civic freedom? Or did they outlaw slavery and 
reintegrate the former Confederate states without significant change 
in the People’s rights or the balance of state and federal powers?  
Between its 1871 decision in Blyew v. United States,32 when the 
Court considered for the first time the reach of federal power under 
the Reconstruction Amendments, and its 1906 ruling in Hodges v. 
United States,33 when it unequivocally declined to read the 
Reconstruction Amendments as granting a markedly greater role for 
the federal government in the protection of individual rights, the 
Court issued no fewer than thirteen decisions in which it grappled 
with the meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments and Congress’s 
power to enforce them.34 In some of these rulings, the Court conceded 
that the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments intended at least 
to invalidate state laws or state actions that explicitly discriminated 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 31. See The Supreme Court Mapping Project, supra note 27. This tool was 
instrumental in tracing the Confederate and People’s narratives in majority and 
dissenting opinions across time. 
 32. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581, 591–95 (1871). 
 33. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 14–15. 
 34. Id. at 1; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 664 (1884); The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. at 3; United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 636–37 (1882); Neal v. 
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386 (1880); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 373 (1879); Ex 
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 317 (1879); 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 
U.S. 542, 554 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875); The 
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 58 (1872); Blyew, 80 U.S. at 581. 
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against African-Americans.35 Nonetheless, a majority of Justices 
remained steadfastly unwilling to consider the far more significant 
question whether the Amendments created new federal rights and 
federal responsibilities to enforce those rights against both state and 
private action.  
The one remarkable exception is a pair of dissents by Justice 
Harlan in The Civil Rights Cases36 and in Hodges,37 in which he 
showed that the Reconstruction Amendments, taken together, created 
a new national charter of civil freedom belonging to American 
citizenship, and subject to national enforcement.38  
In the subsections that follow, we trace the Confederate narrative 
in the majority’s pronouncements between 1871 and 1907 on federal 
power to delineate and enforce civil rights and then review Justice 
Harlan’s articulations of the People’s narrative–both in his well-
known dissent in The Civil Rights Cases39 and in his oft-neglected 
Hodges40 dissent. 
 
A.  The 1787 Constitutional Order Reconstructed 
Victory at Appomattox heralded passage and ratification of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and passage of a 
set of legislative measures to support the Reconstruction project. 
Freedmen Bureau Bills, passed in 1865 and renewed in 1866, 
attempted to address the welfare of millions of men, women and 
children “come into a new birthright, at a time of war and passion, in 
the midst of the stricken, embittered population of their former 
masters.”41 More importantly for our purposes, Congress passed four 
measures to safeguard the rights associated with the citizenship that 
was now a right of birth in the United States. 
First, Congress enacted what we refer to as the Citizenship Act42 
(more commonly known as the Civil Rights Act of 1866) which 
reiterated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of birthright 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 35. Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 664; Neal, 103 U.S. at 397; Ex Parte 
Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345–46; Rives, 100 U.S. at 318; Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.  
 36. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 37. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 20 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id.; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 39. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 40. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 20 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 41. W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Freedmen’s Bureau, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 
1901, at 354, 357, available at http://www.theatlantic.com 
/past/docs/issues/01mar/dubois.htm. 
 42. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §§ 1–3, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 242 (2006)). 
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citizenship and went on to specify that, regardless of color, citizens 
had the rights to enter contracts, sue, present evidence in court, buy, 
hold, and sell property, and enjoy all the benefits of the laws 
theretofore enjoyed by white persons.43 Additionally, the Citizenship 
Act made it a federal crime to deprive any person of the rights it 
protected and created removal jurisdiction in federal courts when civil 
rights enforcement was denied or precluded in state courts.44 
In 1870 Congress passed the Enforcement Act (also known as the 
Force Act), which reenacted the Citizenship Act,45 affirmed the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s right to vote without regard to color, provided 
for the use of federal troops to protect the right to vote, and added a 
new catch-all criminal conspiracy provision, making it a felony for two 
or more persons to conspire with the intent to violate the provisions 
of the Act or to prevent citizens from exercising or enjoying any right 
or privilege granted under the Constitution.46 
By 1871, it was clear that more was needed. Citing “overwhelming 
evidence that through tacit complicity and deliberate inactivity, state 
and local officials were fostering vigilante terrorism against politically 
active blacks and Union sympathizers,” President Grant requested 
emergency legislation to quell rampant Southern violence that states 
were unwilling or powerless to control.47 In response, Congress passed 
the Ku Klux Klan Act.48 As compared to the Force Act, the Klan Act 
extended federal civil rights protection in two significant ways. First, 
whereas the substantive civil penalties of the Force Act were aimed 
at violations of the act itself, the Klan Act created civil penalties for 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the 
Constitution by persons acting under color of state law.49 Second, the 
Klan Act used and expanded language from the catchall conspiracy 
section of the Force Act, to make it a federal crime to conspire to 
deprive persons or classes or persons of any rights granted by the 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 43. Id. at § 1. 
 44. Id. at §§ 2, 3. 
 45. Reenactment was thought necessary to claim or clarify the authority of the 
newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment. See Boyd A. Byers, Adventures in Topsy-Turvy 
Land: Are Civil Rights Claims Arising Under 42 U.S.C. § 1891 Governed by the Federal 
Four-Year “Catch-All” Statute of Limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 1658, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 
509, 513 (1999). 
 46. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1971, 1981, 1987–1991 (2012)).  
 47. Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
1133, 1153 (1977). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)).  
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Constitution or the equal protection of the laws.50 
Finally, in 1875, Congress responded to Jim Crow segregation by 
enacting what we will refer to as the Public Accommodations Act, 
requiring all inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other places of 
public amusement to open their accommodations without regard to 
race, color or previous condition of servitude.51  
According to the People’s narrative, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteen Amendments and the Citizenship, Force, Klan and Public 
Accommodation Acts were to have been the constitutional and 
legislative spine of Reconstruction’s program to establish a national 
charter of the People’s rights. Taking that view of history, one would 
have to say that between 1871 and 1907, Supreme Court rulings 
crippled Reconstruction’s multi-racial and egalitarian project. As we 
demonstrate below, with each crippling blow, the Court sounded the 
Confederate claim that whatever their language or history, the 
Reconstruction Amendments did not carve out a strong role for the 
federal government in defining and protecting civil rights, but worked 
only a narrow reform of the 1789 constitutional order.  
 
B.  Early Supreme Court Interpretation: The 1787 Constitutional 
Order Restored 
Although Slaughterhouse is properly known as the Supreme 
Court’s first interpretation of the meaning and reach of any of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, it was not the first case in which the 
Court took the measure of federal power after secessionist Civil War 
and reunification. Blyew v. United States,52 decided a year earlier, was 
the first in a series of challenges to federal prosecutions for acts of 
supremacist terror. The facts of Blyew are representative. The case 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 50. While the Klan Act’s Section 2 criminal conspiracy provisions were quite 
similar to the equivalent provision in Section 6 of the Force Act, the language of the 
Klan Act covered a broader range of conspiratorial acts than the Force Act. For 
example, the Klan Act made it a criminal offense for two persons to conspire “to 
overthrow, or to put down, or to destroy by force the government of the United States, 
or to levy war against the United States, or to oppose by force the authority of the 
government of the United States, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent, hinder, 
or delay the execution of any law of the United States . . . .” Id. at § 2 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012)). 
 51. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335, 336. Violations of the Public 
Accommodations Act were made punishable as misdemeanors, and persons injured by 
violations of the Act were given the right to recover civil judgments of $500 for each 
offense. Id. at § 2. A genealogy of the Reconstruction legislation described above, 
tracing fragments that survive today, appears as Appendix A.  
 52. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1872). 
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involved the federal prosecution of two white men for the axe murders 
of four members of a black family: a ninety-seven-year old 
grandmother, the mother, the father, and a seventeen-year old boy.53 
The only eyewitness account linking the defendants to the crime was 
the dying declaration of the seventeen-year old boy.54 At the time, 
black people were only competent to testify in Kentucky courts 
against other blacks, and this preclusion encompassed the dead boy’s 
declaration.55 The Citizenship Act authorized federal prosecutors to 
remove cases to federal courts when the “affected persons” whose 
citizenship rights had been denied could not obtain redress in state or 
local courts.56 Relying on that authorization, and citing the 
inadmissibility of the young victim’s dying declaration, the United 
States indicted and convicted the alleged axe murderers in federal 
court.57 The defendants appealed, arguing that the federal 
government had exceeded its enforcement power.58 Positing the 
Confederate narrative’s link between states’ rights and people’s 
freedom, they argued that the Court’s decision would be “felt in its 
influence on the destinies of the country” beyond the Justices’ 
lifetimes, for it would “draw the line of demarcation between the 
powers of a great central government on the one hand and the local 
rights of self-government retained to the States and the People on the 
other.”59 
The Supreme Court overturned the defendants’ convictions, but it 
declined their invitation to treat the case as a clash between federal 
and state power.60 Establishing a pattern of avoidance that recurs 
regularly, both in the early cases addressed in this section and in the 
mid-twentieth century era of civil rights protest addressed in the next 
section, the Court avoided reaching constitutional questions of state 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 53. Id. 
 54. The only survivors of the attack were a thirteen-year old girl who was 
brutally hacked, and her ten-year old sister who was hiding in the family’s one-room 
cabin. Id. at 585. 
 55. Id. at 592. 
 56. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §§ 2, 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012)). 
 57. Blyew, 80 U.S. at 583–84. 
 58. Id. at 584. 
 59. Jeremiah Black, Argument for Kentucky, Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 
(1872), reprinted in CHAUNCEY F. BLACK, ESSAYS AND SPEECHES OF JEREMIAH S. 
BLACK WITH A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 539 (1885).  
 60. See Blyew, 80 U.S. at 591 (viewing the question before it as one of statutory 
interpretation instead). 
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and federal power by deciding the case on the basis of a technicality.61 
Here, as in subsequent cases we will describe, the avoidance by 
technicality move seems questionable. Nonetheless, Blyew can be said 
to have “afforded the Supreme Court with its earliest opportunity—
an opportunity that it used—to begin the substantial devastation of 
the federal government’s civil rights powers that followed over the 
next generation.”62 
Slaughterhouse was the Court’s next–and its first direct–address 
of the post-Reconstruction balance of state and federal power with 
respect to civil rights, and in it the Confederate narrative sounds 
loudly. Slaughterhouse is a case full of vexing ironies. It involved a 
claim brought by opponents of Reconstruction who calculated relying 
on the Reconstruction Amendments to challenge acts of Louisiana’s 
multi-racial Reconstruction legislature.63 Moreover, it was decided by 
a Court packed with Republican supporters of Reconstruction’s civil 
rights agenda.64 Nonetheless, it resulted in a radical limitation of 
federal power to enforce that agenda.65 
The well-known story is that New Orleans butchers sued to 
invalidate a Louisiana statute regulating the slaughtering of animals 
within city limits.66 The butchers argued that the statute, which 
compelled them to use a state-chartered slaughtering facility, violated 
nearly every freedom the Reconstruction Amendments were designed 
to protect: It exacted involuntary servitude; it abridged privileges and 
immunities of their citizenship, and it denied them equal protection 
and due process of law.67 The “black and tan”68 Louisiana legislature 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 61. Framing the question before it as one of statutory interpretation, the Court 
reasoned that “affected” persons within the meaning of the Citizenship Act were 
limited to parties to an action. Id. at 594. 
 62. Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Judicial Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
469, 474 (1989). 
 63. RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: 
REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 126 (2005); see 
MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND 
THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 198–200 (2003).  
 64. ROSS, supra note 64, at 201. 
 65. See id. at 200 (noting that Judge Miller’s narrow interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause prevented “the federal 
government [from having] greater powers to protect the civil and natural rights of 
African-Americans from discriminatory and violent acts”). 
 66. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 43 (1872). 
 67. Id. at 43–44. 
 68. “Black and tan” was commonly used to describe racially integrated 
legislatures during the Reconstruction Era. Richard L. Hume, Carpetbaggers in the 
Reconstruction South: A Group Portrait of Outside Whites in the “Black and Tan” 
Constitutional Conventions, 64 J. AM. HIST. 313, 313 (1977). 
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countered that the statute was a legitimate exercise of the state’s 
police power, designed to rid New Orleans of persistent plagues 
caused by the unregulated dumping of butchering waste.69 
The Court recognized that it had been called on to gauge the effect 
of the Reconstruction Amendments on the 1789 Constitution and that 
nothing so consequential had been brought to them during any of the 
Justices’ tenures.70 It acknowledged that by enacting and ratifying the 
three Reconstruction Amendments the nation “recur[red] again to the 
great source of power in this country, the people of the States”71 in 
order to secure “additional guarantees of human rights; additional 
powers to the Federal government; [and] additional restraints upon 
those of the States.”72 But, the Court hastened to add that the 
amendments were also part of a “process of restoring to their proper 
relations with the federal government and with the other States those 
which had sided with the rebellion[.]”73 The Justices were bound, 
then, to balance respect for the momentousness of an amendment 
process that altered the state and federal balance of power in defense 
of human rights against the need for “proper” restoration of the 
powers of states that had been in rebellion. The Justices did so by 
emphasizing the narrower goal of ending human chattel slavery 
rather than the larger goal of protecting human rights.74 Harking 
back to the 1867 Constitution rather than its post-Civil War 
reconstruction, the Court reasoned that the privileges and immunities 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment were limited to those few 
that flowed uniquely from national citizenship.75 The definition and 
protection of basic civil rights were therefore left to the various 
states.76 Underlying this interpretation was the strong suggestion 
that the Reconstruction Congress and the ratifying states acted 
“[u]nder the pressure of . . . excited feeling” and therefore neglected, 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 69. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 62. 
 70. Id. at 67 (“No questions so far-reaching and pervading in their consequences, 
so profoundly interesting to the people of this country, and so important in their 
bearing upon the relations of the United States, and of the several States to each other 
and to the citizens of the States and of the United States, have been before this court 
during the official life of any of its present members.”).  
 71. Id. at 67 (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. at 67–68. 
 73. Id. at 70. 
 74. See id. at 71 (noting that the “pervading purpose” of the Amendments was 
the “freedom of the slave race”). 
 75. Id. at 74. 
 76. Id. at 77 (concluding that it was not “the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights 
heretofore belonging exclusively to the States”). 
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rather than recalibrated, the balance of state and federal power.77 
Slaughterhouse is fascinating because it stood civil rights 
discourse on its head, with customary civil rights proponents on the 
side of state autonomy and customary opponents on the side of federal 
intervention. In putting autonomous behavior in marketplaces under 
an individual rights umbrella, it encouraged commercial actors to 
take the Reconstruction Amendments as a shield behind which 
business enterprises arguably have come to benefit more from 
Fourteenth Amendment protections than more traditional targets of 
discrimination or oppression.78 Blyew was the more traditional civil 
rights case, and, as we have indicated, post-Slaughterhouse it was 
followed by a string of similar cases in which federal authorities 
attempted to combat supremacist exclusion and terror, and the Court 
ruled that they lacked authority to do so. United States v. Cruikshank 
was the next such case, and it brought the Court to take a direct 
stance on the question of federal power to prosecute cases of anti-civil 
rights terrorism.79 
After Louisiana’s 1872 gubernatorial election, two candidates 
declared victory: William Pitt Kellogg, a Republican and supporter of 
Reconstruction and John McEnery, a Democrat and former 
Confederate commander.80 While the disputed election made its way 
through the federal courts, each camp attempted to appoint local 
officials.81 In the parish that included Colfax, Louisiana, both sides 
made judicial appointments, and freedmen gathered in the parish 
courthouse to support and protect the Republican appointees.82 In 
what came to be known as the Colfax Massacre, three hundred white 
men, most mounted on horseback and armed with rifles, set fire to the 
courthouse, and killed more than three hundred freedmen as they 
tried to surrender.83 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 77. See id. at 82  
 78. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 89–90 (1938) (Black, J., 
dissenting) “[O]f the cases in this Court in which the Fourteenth Amendment was 
applied during the first fifty years after its adoption, less than one-half of one per cent. 
invoked it in protection of the negro race, and more than fifty per cent. asked that its 
benefits be extended to corporations.”). 
 79. See CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 229–49 (2008). 
 80. Id. at 13. 
 81. Id. at 13–14. 
 82. JAMES K. HOGUE, UNCIVIL WAR: FIVE NEW ORLEANS STREET BATTLES AND 
THE RISE AND FALL OF RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION 107–08 (2006). 
 83. See id. at 109–11 (giving a detailed account of the battle and massacre at 
Colfax). 
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The State made no effort to prosecute the white assailants.84 The 
United States indicted several assailants under the Force Act 
charging that they had conspired to deprive the murdered freedmen 
of their civil rights.85 The Court held that Congress exceeded its 
powers when it authorized federal enforcement of what the Court 
regarded as state-granted rights.86 It therefore dismissed all of the 
federal changes.87 In doing so, it offered an analysis of the 
constitutional balance between state and federal power that has been 
repeated so often by subsequent courts that it has come to sound (and 
to serve) as a statement of faith about the proper role of the federal 
government in defining and protecting the People’s rights—a 
catechism to be repeated without question or doubt.88 One might call 
it the Cruikshank creed.  
The Cruikshank creed incorporates the major themes of the 
Confederate narrative. Its tenets are that before the Union was 
formed, the People granted power to the various states.89 In 1787, the 
States surrendered very limited powers to a federation. Powers not 
surrendered to the federation remain exclusively with the states,90 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 84. Following the massacre, white Democrats let loose a reign of terror over the 
county so as to foreclose any possibility of local prosecution. See LANE, supra note 79, 
at 129 (describing a “new campaign to kill or expel Republicans”). When United States 
Attorney James Beckwith brought charges against the defendants under the Force 
Act, jurors and witnesses were physically intimidated and even violently attacked. Id. 
at 151–53 (detailing the murders of several witnesses to the Colfax Massacre); see 
HOGUE, supra note 82, at 115 (2006) (noting that after the Colfax Massacre, black men 
willing to stand up to white pressure received a “never-to-be-forgotten message to stay 
away from politics altogether”); LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE: THE 
UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK POWER, WHITE TERROR, AND THE DEATH OF 
RECONSTRUCTION 119 (2008) (noting attempts on the lives of the local district attorney 
and a local African-American judge in response to the Colfax indictments).  
 85. At trial, a mostly white jury convicted three defendants of violating section 6 
of the Force Act. For purposes of appeal, Justice Joseph P. Bradley, riding circuit in 
New Orleans, joined Circuit Judge William B. Woods on the bench during trial. On 
June 27, 1874, Justice Bradley and Judge Woods split: Justice Bradley announced his 
opinion to overturn the convictions; Justice Woods disagreed, thereby guaranteeing 
the appeal to the Supreme Court. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 
1866-1876, at 176–81 (1985). 
 86. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556–57 (1875). 
 87. Id. at 559. 
 88. See, e.g., text accompanying note 296 infra. 
 89. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 549 (“Citizens are the members of the political 
community to which they belong . . . . In the formation of a government, the people 
may confer upon it such powers as they choose.”). 
 90. Id. at 550 (“Within the scope of its powers, as enumerated and defined, [the 
national government] is supreme and above the States; but beyond, it has no 
existence.”). 
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and the states serve the People by carefully guarding their reserved 
powers.91 For this comprehensive theory of state sovereignty, 
Cruikshank cited only two authorities: Slaughterhouse and the 
Preamble to the Constitution.92  
Dismissals of prosecutions for acts of racial terrorism continued, 
as the Court narrowed each of the post-War civil rights enforcement 
statutes to protect states’ sovereignty. In United States v. Harris, the 
Court unanimously relied on Slaughterhouse as it applied the tenets 
of the Cruikshank creed to dismiss indictments under the Klan Act 
against members of a Tennessee lynch mob.93 Hodges v. United States 
was similar: dismissing a federal indictment brought under the Force 
Act against members of an Arkansas lynch mob, the Court returned 
to the theme introduced in Blyew, affirmed as law in Slaughterhouse, 
set out as creed in Cruikshank, and reaffirmed in Harris, to explain 
once again that the Reconstruction Amendments had not significantly 
altered the 1787 balance of federal and state power.94 
In United States v. Reese, the Court extended its states’ rights 
analysis to limit the applicability of the voting rights provisions of the 
Force Act.95 A state official who refused to permit an African-
American man to vote was held to be immune from federal charges 
because it had not been alleged that the refusal was because of his 
race.96 Here, as in Slaughterhouse, the Court saw the focus and impact 
of the Reconstruction Amendments as protecting African-Americans 
against discrimination in civic affairs rather than establishing a broad 
charter of civil rights: The Fifteenth Amendment is, the Court 
concluded, an antidiscrimination measure that “does not confer the 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 91. Id. (“The people of the United States resident within any State are subject to 
two governments: one State, and the other National; but there need be no conflict 
between the two. The powers which one possesses, the other does not. They are 
established for different purposes, and have separate jurisdictions. Together they 
make one whole, and furnish the people of the United States with a complete 
government, ample for the protection of all their rights at home and abroad.”).  
 92. See id. at 549 (“The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the 
United States and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of those 
governments will be different from those he has under the other.”) (citing The 
Slaughterhouse Cases, 68 U.S. at 74); id. at 549–50 (citing U.S. CONST. pmbl.). 
 93. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1882). 
 94. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906) (“Notwithstanding the 
adoption of these three Amendments, the National Government still remains one of 
enumerated powers, and the Tenth Amendment, which reads, ‘the powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, 
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people,’ is not shorn of its vitality.”). 
 95. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221–22 (1875). 
 96. Id. at 218. 
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right of suffrage upon any one.”97 
Although they were decided favorably for the civil rights plaintiffs 
and are cited by some scholars as the high-water mark of the Court’s 
Reconstruction jurisprudence Virginia v. Rives,98 Strauder v. West 
Virginia,99 Ex parte Virginia,100 and Neal v. Delaware101 also yielded 
narrow readings of the Reconstruction Amendments. In each of these 
cases, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the 
exclusion of blacks from jury service, not because jury service is an 
entitlement of national citizenship, but because the exclusions 
constituted racially discriminatory state action that denied black 
jurors equal protection of the laws.102  
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court invalidated in its entirety the 
last of the post-War civil rights statutes: the Public Accommodations 
Act.103 In doing so, the Court rejected the democratic vision that had 
inspired proponents of the Act and revived its opponents’ false 
dichotomy between political and civil rights on one hand, and “social 
rights” on the other. In the course of four years of debate over the 
Public Accommodations Act, opponents had lodged two main 
arguments against the bill: they argued, consistent with the 
Confederate narrative, that it represented an unconstitutional 
encroachment of federal authority upon states’ rights,104 and they 
argued that the Reconstruction Amendments intended to give newly 
freed slaves political and civil, but not social, equality.105 Granting 
“social rights” to black people, they argued, would be unacceptable to 
the majority of Southern citizens in that it would enforce the sort of 
social equality that both races would find repugnant. The next step, 
they warned their fellow white congressmen, would be that black 
people would “demand a law allowing them, without restraint, to visit 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 97. Id. at 217. 
 98. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). 
 99. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
 100. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). 
 101. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880). 
 102. Id. at 397; Rives, 100 U.S. at 320–21; Strauder, 100 U.S. at 312, Ex parte 
Virginia, 100 U.S. at 348. 
 103. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883). 
 104. See 2 CONG. REC. 388, 405 (1874) (statement of Rep. Durham) (“[Regulation 
of schools] are matters purely of local legislation or of private contract.”); CONG. 
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3190 (1872) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (“[Attending 
school] is not any right at all. It is a matter to be regulated by the localities.”); Alfred 
H. Kelly, The Congressional Controversy Over School Segregation, 1867-1875, 64 AM. 
HIST. REV. 537, 548 (1959). 
 105. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3189 (1872) (statement of Sen. 
Trumbull) (“The right to go to school is not a civil right and never was.”). 
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the parlors and drawing-rooms of the whites, and have free and 
unrestrained social intercourse with your unmarried sons and 
daughters.”106 These arguments reflected what was then a frequently 
articulated taxonomy of rights, distinguishing among civil and 
political rights, e.g., the rights to buy and sell property; to enter into 
contracts; to serve on juries; to appear as witnesses in court; to vote, 
and the “social right” to be accommodated in public spaces. This 
taxonomy was given the Court’s imprimatur in Plessy v. Ferguson 
when the majority explained, “If the civil and political rights of both 
races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. 
If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the 
United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”107 
However, as historian Rebecca Scott has established, “[t]o conflate 
the phrase ‘social equality’ with an imagined taxonomy of civil, 
political, and social rights is to mistake an insult for an analytic 
exercise.”108 The rights that proponents of the Public Accommodations 
Act meant to secure were not so-called social rights but public rights. 
In the words of Representative John Lynch, “It is not social rights that 
we desire . . . What we ask is protection in the enjoyment of public 
rights. Rights which are or should be accorded to every citizen 
alike.”109 As Representative Robert Elliot explained, these were “the 
right to enjoy the common public conveniences of travel on public 
highways, of rest and refreshment at public inns, of education in 
public schools, of burial in public cemeteries . . . .”110 In short, the 
proponents of the Public Accommodation Acts—some of them former 
slaves—articulated a vision of American democratic citizenship that 
would take a century for a majority of the Supreme Court to 
understand: constitutional citizenship “consists in having a 
responsible share according to the capacity in forming and directing 
the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating 
according to the need in the values which the group sustains.”111 
Seeing public accommodation as a “social right,” and seeing no 
state involvement in the maintenance of Jim Crow segregation, the 
majority in the Civil Rights Cases saw no authority in the federal 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 106. 2 CONG. REC. 341, app., 343 (1874) (statement of Rep. Read). 
 107. Plessy v. Ferguson, 153 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). 
 108. Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality and the Conceptual Roots of 
the Plessy Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777, 781 (2007). 
 109. 3 CONG. REC. 920, 944 (1875) (statement of Rep. Lynch) (emphasis in 
original). 
 110. 2 CONG. REC. 388, 409 (1874) (statement of Rep. Elliott). 
 111. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, An Essay in Political Inquiry 147 
(1927). 
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government to end it.112 The Fourteenth Amendment only addressed 
state actions with respect to political and civil rights, and although 
the Thirteenth Amendment reached both private and public action, 
the Court held that denials of public accommodation had “nothing to 
do with slavery or involuntary servitude.”113 The states’ rights theme 
of the Cruikshank creed was again sounded: if those denials violated 
any right, “redress [was] to be sought under the laws of the 
state. . . .”114 
 
C.  The Competing Interpretation: A New Charter of Freedom 
There is irony in the legacy of the Civil Rights Cases. Although the 
Court’s decision has not been overruled, scholars have regularly 
questioned its reasoning.115 The durability of the majority opinion has 
much to do with the fact that it followed the Cruikshank creed—and 
hence the Confederate narrative—in positing and focusing on a 
conflict between state and federal power and fixating on that conflict 
rather than addressing the more fundamental question whether the 
civil rights claimants were entitled, as national citizens, to public 
accommodation or to any basic civil right.  
By contrast, Justice Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases 
squarely faced the fundamental questions concerning the attributes 
of national citizenship and concluded that the Reconstruction 
Amendments and accompanying federal legislation were “adopted in 
the interest of liberty, and for the purpose of securing, through 
national legislation rights inhering in the state of freedom and 
belonging to American citizenship.”116 Justice Harlan’s dissent begins 
and ends with the observation that national rights require national 
enforcement.117 
Harlan observed with bitter irony that the 1787 Constitution, 
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together with the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,118 the Fugitive Slave Act 
of 1850,119 and the Court’s own decisions in Prigg v. Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania,120 Ableman v. Booth,121 and Dred Scott v. 
Sandford,122 established as much when they gave the federal 
government authority to enforce slaveholders’ rights to human 
subjugation as a property interest.123 While no clause of the 1787 
Constitution explicitly empowered Congress to enforce the master’s 
right to his slave, Prigg established that Congress had implicit 
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authority to do so because “a clause of the Constitution conferring a 
right should not be so construed as to make it shadowy, or 
unsubstantial, or leave the citizen without a remedial power adequate 
for its protection.”124 
Under Justice Harlan’s reading, the Reconstruction Amendments 
“did something more than to prohibit slavery as an institution . . . 
[they] established and decreed universal civil freedom throughout the 
United States.”125 In contrast, to the Court’s earlier and shameful 
rulings that Congress had power to protect the right to hold human 
beings as chattel, he argued that: 
  
[T]he national government has the power, whether expressly 
given or not, to secure rights protected by the Constitution. 
That doctrine ought not now to be abandoned when the inquiry 
is not as to an implied power to protect the master’s rights but 
what may Congress, under powers expressly granted, do for the 
protection of freedom and the rights necessarily inhering in a 
state of freedom.126 
 
Justice Harlan drew a crucial link between the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition of slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
grant of birthright citizenship in Section 1. The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s citizenship clause was, Harlan argued, a “supreme act 
of the nation” that instantly brought black people “into the political 
community known as the ‘People of the United States.’”127 The civil 
freedom conferred by the Thirteenth Amendment therefore 
encompasses the privileges and immunities of citizenship. As Justice 
Harlan put it, the Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress power 
“in terms distinct and positive, to enforce ‘the provisions of [Section 
1],’ of [the] amendment; not simply those of a prohibitive character, 
but the provisions—all of the provisions—affirmative and prohibitive, 
of the amendment.”128  
According to Harlan, this interplay between the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments meant that Congress had full power to 
protect those rights “fundamental in citizenship in a free republican 
government.”129 The Reconstruction Amendments and acts designed 
to enforce them were meant “to compel a recognition of the legal right 
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of the black race to take the rank of citizens, and to secure the 
enjoyment of privileges belonging, under the law, to them as a 
component part of the people for whose welfare and happiness 
government is ordained.”130 He ended as he began, with reference to 
the Court’s earlier support of slave power: 
 
I insist that the national legislature may, without 
transcending the limits of the Constitution, do for human 
liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship, 
what it did, with the sanction of this court, for the protection 
of slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive slaves.131 
 
Nearly twenty years later, having endured the succession of cases 
holding the federal government impotent to protect against 
supremacist terrorism, the Justice made clear, dissenting in Hodges, 
the Arkansas lynching case, the full reach of the rights of national 
citizenship that the Reconstruction Amendments, taken together, 
should secure to all: 
 
[T]he liberty protected by the 14th Amendment against state 
action inconsistent with due process of law is neither more nor 
less than the freedom established by the 13th Amendment . . . 
[S]uch liberty “means not only the right of the citizen to be 
free from the mere physical restraint of his person . . . but the 
term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free 
in the enjoyment of all his faculties.”132 
 
II.  POWER AND THE PEOPLE: CIVIL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE TESTED BY 
A PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT 
Civil rights statutes that Justice Harlan thought legitimate under 
the post-slavery constitution lay nearly dormant in subsequent years. 
Their disuse was not entirely attributable to their critical reading by 
the Supreme Court. As the Court shrank from what seemed to have 
been clear implications of the Reconstruction Amendments for federal 
enforcement of civil rights, many white Americans grew weary and 
wary of Reconstruction’s multi-racial vision and increasingly 
sympathetic to the former Confederacy’s complaints of occupation, 
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abuse, and disempowerment. What the Court in Slaughterhouse had 
described as a goal of restoring the seceded states to their 1787 powers 
became a national priority as compromise was reached with southern 
Democrats and federal intervention in southern affairs came to be 
seen as untoward.133  
Notwithstanding the official and popular retreat from 
Reconstruction’s commitment to a fulsome idea of national 
citizenship, the vision lived among the People—especially among 
those who had endured the status of constitutional property. In every 
dimension of personal and public life, African-Americans, women, and 
other subordinated groups regularly claimed and enacted what they 
understood to be their rights to full and free citizenship.  
The wave of sit-in, freedom ride, and voter registration activity 
that culminated in the 1960s has been perhaps the most conspicuous 
and consequential revival of Reconstruction-era claims of national 
citizenship. As civil rights leader Robert Moses reports, sit-in 
demonstrators, freedom riders, and voting rights activists enacted a 
freedom that they understood to be their birthright. Moses explains 
that “We, as People of the United States” claimed with our bodies the 
rights to occupy public space as civic equals and to be counted in the 
political process.134 Moses also reports that the Reconstruction-era 
civil rights statutes—broken as they were in the interpretive process 
described in the preceding section—provided “crawl space” for the 
Civil Rights Movement that culminated in the 1960s.135 When 1957 
civil rights legislation created a Civil Rights Division within the 
Justice Department, federal enforcement became more focused, and 
civil rights workers gained a direct line through which they could call 
on federal authorities to provide some relief from repeated and 
lengthy jailings (and, in some cases, from spending time in some of 
the nation’s worst prisons) and to provide protection, albeit tragically 
limited protection, against supremacist violence.136 For authority to 
provide that relief and protection, federal officials relied on the 
Reconstruction Amendments and on remnants of the post-Civil War 
legislation that was to have been the spine of Reconstruction. The 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 133. See generally HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: 
RACE, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865-1901, at 122–55 
(2001). 
 134. Robert P Moses, Speech at Colgate College 12–17 (January 20, 2011) (on file 
with the authors). 
 135. ROBERT P. MOSES & CHARLES E. COBB, JR., RADICAL EQUATIONS: CIVIL 
RIGHTS FROM MISSISSIPPI TO THE ALGEBRA PROJECT, 92 (2001). 
 136. See Symposium, Voices of the Civil Rights Division, Then and Now, 44 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 269 (2013). 
326 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84.301 
 
movement’s “crawl space” was created, then, by cobbling together a 
rather feeble piece of mid-twentieth century civil rights legislation 
and the residue of congressional Reconstruction: the Justice 
Department’s newly created Civil Rights Division summoned powers 
created by post-Civil War amendments and statutes in response to the 
claims and calls of a People’s movement.137 
The 1960s civil rights movement called upon federal power to 
vindicate two kinds of claims. In what we term civil rights 
“enforcement” cases, the Civil Rights Division attempted to prosecute 
opponents of the movement for acts of terrorism against civil rights 
advocates. These federal prosecutions were challenged on the ground 
that the national government was usurping the states’ police power. 
In what we term civil rights “enactment” cases, protesters performed 
what they saw as a national right to inhabit public spaces on an 
integrated basis and to participate in local and federal political 
processes. These enactments were the genius of the 1960s Civil Rights 
Movement; they were “demand side” demonstrations of the free 
citizenship to which the protesters thought all people were entitled. 
In response to their enactments of citizenship, protesters were 
arrested, charged, and convicted of state crimes like trespassing or 
disturbing the peace. Turning here to the federal courts, rather than 
to the Justice Department, protesters challenged these prosecutions 
on the ground that people could not be punished for exercising their 
national constitutional rights to peacefully inhabit public spaces and 
to participate in political processes. Both enforcement claims and 
enactment claims were contests between state and federal power, 
with states claiming supremacy in the realm of policing human 
behavior and the national government claiming supremacy as a 
guardian of human rights. 
 
A.  Assigning the “Occasional Unpleasant Task” of Civil Rights 
Enforcement 
 To set the 1960s cases in context, we must look to two sets of cases 
that predated the Movement’s rise to prominence. After the 
significant post-Reconstruction hiatus in federal civil rights 
prosecutions,138 the Court faced, in 1945, yet another federal attempt 
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to punish white supremacist terror. The facts fit a familiar pattern: 
Claude Screws, the Sheriff of the somewhat notorious Baker County 
in Georgia, acting with a deputy and a local police officer, arrested 
Robert Hall, a young black man accused of stealing a tire.139 They 
handcuffed Hall, drove him to the local courthouse, beat him nearly 
to death, dragged him feet-first across the courthouse lawn to a jail, 
threw him on the floor and summoned an ambulance.140 Robert Hall 
died within an hour of being transported to a local hospital.141 Screws 
and his collaborators faced no state charges, but were convicted in 
federal court, under surviving provisions of the Citizenship Act,142 of 
conspiring to violate, and violating, Hall’s civil rights.143 
When the Georgia officers appealed, three Justices stood firmly 
against federal prosecution of what they understood to be state 
crimes. Justice Frankfurter wrote for them, invoking the Confederate 
narrative to argue that the officers’ federal prosecution 
unconstitutionally disrupted the steady state of Georgia’s sovereignty 
with respect to the enforcement of criminal laws. Noting that the 
murder of Robert Hall was a state crime, these justices argued that 
where “[s]tate law is in conformity with the Constitution and local 
misconduct is in undisputed violation of that State law” it was 
preferable to “leave to the States the enforcement of their criminal 
law,” and not “weaken the habits of local law enforcement by tempting 
reliance on federal authority for an occasional unpleasant task of local 
enforcement.”144 Justice Douglas, in just the sixth of his thirty-six 
years on the bench, wrote for the Court and elided the question of 
federal power by reversing on the ground that the jury had not been 
instructed to find a willful violation of Hall’s constitutional rights, and 
remanding for a new trial under more precise jury instruction.145  
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Dissenting Justices Murphy and Rutledge shined a critical light 
on the Court’s failure to directly address the reach of federal power 
and the value, in this context, of state supremacy. Justice Murphy 
wrote passionately to argue that Federal constitutional power was 
sufficient and necessary to protect against “the cruelties of bigoted 
and ruthless [state and local] authority.”146 Justice Rutledge 
challenged what he saw underlying both the Douglas opinion’s resort 
to technicalities and the Frankfurter opinion’s wishful deference to 
the State of Georgia: The underlying issue was, he said, the question 
of “federal power.”147 Echoing the first Justice Harlan, Rutledge then 
argued that in the world created by the Reconstruction Amendments, 
“federal power lacks no strength to reach [state officials’] malfeasance 
in office when it infringes constitutional rights.”148  
The Screws prosecutions were not so far in time from Civil War 
and Reconstruction that they escaped their aftermath. In the 1940s 
(and long after), it was still regularly taught—and believed—that 
Reconstruction was at best an idealistic mistake and at worst a fit of 
vengeful rule by uncomprehending or malicious Carpetbaggers and 
incompetent blacks.149 Justice Frankfurter’s deliberately narrow 
reading of the Reconstruction legislation under which Screws and his 
collaborators had been charged alluded uncritically to this view of 
Reconstruction. “It is familiar history,” he said, “that much of this 
legislation was born of that vengeful spirit which to no small degree 
envenomed the Reconstruction era. Legislative respect for 
constitutional limitations was not at its height and Congress passed 
laws clearly unconstitutional.”150  
As if in answer to this view of Reconstruction, Justice Rutledge 
wrote that if federal power to protect civil rights is a great power, “it 
is one generated by the Constitution and the Amendments, to which 
the states have assented and their officials owe prime allegiance.”151 
At the heart of Justice Rutledge’s cri de coeur, was the conundrum 
this article seeks to confront: How can there be a federal right without 
a federal remedy? Resolving it will require a deeper understanding 
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than the Court has yet undertaken of the values protected by the 
separation of state and federal responsibilities. 
Sheriff Screws and his codefendants were retried under the 
Douglas opinion’s recommended instructions. Each was acquitted, 
and each returned to state law enforcement duties.152 Moreover, the 
Douglas opinion’s requirements made prosecution of civil rights 
violations almost prohibitively difficult.153 Justices Murphy and 
Rutledge both died in 1949, but broodings about federal power to 
enforce civil rights did not die with them. As we will see, Justice 
Douglas soon abandoned the cautious stance he had announced in 
Screws and took up the Murphy/Rutledge call for national 
enforcement of civil rights.  
Ironically, the Court next confronted the question of the 
Department’s power to enforce federal constitutional rights in two 
1951 cases that made no mention of, and seemingly had nothing to do 
with, racial justice. Yet, here again, it proved impossible for the Court 
to issue a majority opinion addressing the reach of Federal civil rights 
enforcement power. The cases, both captioned United States v. 
Williams, and decided on the same day, arose out of an effort by the 
Justice Department to prosecute three “deputized” investigators and 
a police officer who had, at the request of the owners of a hardware 
store in Miami, Florida, beaten and tortured store employees to get 
them to confess to stealing lumber.154  
We have seen that, beginning with the Force Act, Reconstruction 
legislation criminalized both direct interferences with civil rights and 
conspiracies to interfere with civil rights. One of the Williams cases 
involved a conviction under surviving remnants of the conspiracy 
provision (the application of which had been precluded, without 
government appeal, during an early phase of the attempted 
prosecution of Sheriff Screws) and another involved a conviction 
under surviving remnants of the direct or substantive criminal 
provision (the provision that was at issue when the Court vacated 
Sheriff Screws’ conviction).155 These two cases were rematches in the 
battle over federal power that had been fought in Screws and here 
Justices Douglas and Frankfurter squared off in sharp disagreement.  
The conviction under the substantive provision had been obtained 
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under a charging script tailored in its description of willfulness to 
meet the vagueness concerns of which Douglas had written in 
Screws.156 Douglas wrote for the majority, retreating somewhat from 
the charging requirements he had set in Screws. Noting that the 
Screws charging requirements were necessary in cases in which the 
intent to deprive someone of constitutional rights was unclear, 
Douglas hinted at their possible superfluousness in this classic case 
of coerced confession: the intent to deny the victims’ constitutional 
rights was, he wrote, “plain as a pikestaff.”157 Justice Frankfurter 
wrote briefly for three other Justices, to say that they dissented for 
the reasons set forth in Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in Screws 
and to make the (unexplained) comment that they were strengthened 
in their views by “[e]xperience in the effort to apply the doctrine of 
Screws.”158  
In the conspiracy case, Frankfurter wrote for the same three 
Justices who had dissented in the substantive case and for Chief 
Justice Vinson. The opinion’s conclusions were consistent with 
Frankfurter’s earlier positions, but difficult to reconcile with the 
outcome in the substantive case. Despite strong similarities in the 
wording and professed purposes of the substantive and conspiracy 
provisions, Justice Frankfurter argued that the conspiracy provision 
was less broad. It was less broad, he said, not because of its language 
or purpose, but because of a want of constitutional authority. In words 
that call to mind the reasoning of Slaughterhouse,159 Frankfurter 
wrote that the conspiracy provision did not address conspiracies to 
deny the full panoply of federal civil rights, but only conspiracies to 
deny rights “arising from the substantive powers of the Federal 
Government.”160 The gravamen of Frankfurter’s critique was that the 
conspiracy provision only covered conduct that the Federal 
government had power, independently of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
to enforce against individuals,161 and the federal government had no 
power to forbid individuals to violate other individuals’ civil rights.162 
Conspiring to commit the act was safe against Federal sanction, they 
argued, even though the Court had held that the action itself was 
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subject to Federal sanction.163  
In defense of his narrow and contradictory reading of the 
conspiracy provision, Frankfurter relied pivotally on 
Cruikshank.164He also revived his critique of Reconstruction 
legislation, asserting that “[t]he dominant conditions of the 
Reconstruction Period were not conducive to the enactment of 
carefully considered and coherent legislation” and that “[s]trong post-
war feeling caused inadequate deliberation and led to loose and 
careless phrasing of laws relating to the new political issues.”165 The 
count was dead even, with the reach and effectiveness of the 
Reconstruction conspiracy provision—and the fates of the defendants’ 
conspiracy convictions—undetermined. Justice Black broke the tie—
and saved the defendants from their conspiracy convictions—by 
ruling that the convictions were invalid on more technical grounds.166  
The constitutional reach of both the conspiracy provision and the 
substantive provision remained uncertain: Four justices would 
apparently limit the conspiracy provision to cover interferences with 
what the Court in Slaughterhouse had carved out as uniquely federal 
rights; four would apply it to protect against interference with any 
rights guaranteed by the federal constitution. Before the Court faced 
this nest of issues again it had been sobered, but perhaps even more 
confounded, by cases that presented a flip side of federal prosecutions 
for Jim Crow violence: state prosecutions for civil rights 
demonstrations in which protesters “enacted” rights that they 
believed were federally protected, and their enactments were 
punished as state crimes.  
 
B.  Protecting the Enactment of Free Citizenship 
As we saw in our consideration of federal prosecutions against 
supremacist violence, there has been intense disagreement about 
whether and how federal civil rights enforcement power is limited by 
the fact that Fourteenth Amendment proscriptions are in the form “no 
State shall” (just as Bill of Rights proscriptions are in the form 
“Congress shall make no law”). Some take this language to mean that 
the federal government is helpless to punish denials of civil rights 
unless those denials represent or are “colored” by “state action.” 
Others, noting that the Fourteenth Amendment’s language also 
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confers citizenship, argue that Congress has power to do all that is 
necessary and proper to secure the privileges of citizenship. The 
question whether a private establishment that is in other respects 
open to the public may exclude people on the basis of race elicits an 
analogous pair of responses—some arguing that anti-discrimination 
is an obligation that only governments owe to the People, and others 
arguing that every citizen has a right to be accommodated in public 
spaces. Using their passively resistant bodies to integrate 
establishments that were open to the public but marked “For Whites 
Only,” civil rights demonstrators in the 1960s placed their black and 
white bodies in spaces designated “for colored only,” to present an 
enforcement conundrum: Could they be ejected by state police and 
prosecuted for trespass or ejected by private force? Were they entitled to 
federal protection, or were they in a state of nature? 
When Movement demonstrators provoked local hostility by 
defying and speaking against Jim Crow laws, they were arrested and 
prosecuted for trespassing, disturbing the peace, unlawful assembly 
and the like. They sought relief in Federal courts, claiming that the 
State prosecutions violated their federal right to public 
accommodation. In Screws and in the Williams cases, federal civil 
rights laws enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment were to have been 
a sword against local, anti-civil rights harassment and intimidation. 
In these cases, the Amendment itself was used as a shield against 
local prosecution of civil rights activists. Forthright determination of 
the activists’ claims would have forced the Court to confront, in 
another guise, the question of federal power that it had dodged in 
Screws and Williams. Although civil rights lawyers raised the power 
issue, most of the justices chose to skirt it. Justice Douglas was the 
consistent exception. 
During the 1960s, the Supreme Court considered 31 cases 
involving sit-ins and other kinds of civil rights protest.167 In the first 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 167. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118 
(1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 
(1965); Walker v. Georgia, 381 U.S. 355 (1965); Parrot v. City of Tallahassee, 381 U.S. 
129 (1965); McKinnie v. Tennessee, 380 U.S. 449 (1965); Blow v. North Carolina, 379 
U.S. 684 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 
U.S. 306 (1964); Drews v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 547 (1964); Dresner v. City of 
Tallahassee, 378 U.S. 539 (1964); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Bell 
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Henry v. 
City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964); Diamond v. Louisiana, 376 U.S. 201 (1964); 
Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963); Randolph v. Virginia, 374 U.S. 97 (1963); 
Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 
374 (1963); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 
267 (1963); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963); Peterson v. City 
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of them, a 1960 case involving black demonstrators who had been 
convicted in 1951168 of trespassing on a segregated public golf course, 
there was agreement that access to the course could not 
constitutionally be denied on account of race, but a bare majority, over 
strong objection, deemed itself unable on technical grounds to vacate 
the convictions or remand the case for further consideration in the 
state courts.169 This was, however, the last time the Supreme Court 
would affirm a criminal conviction for a civil rights protest in the mid-
twentieth century. 
 Seasoned criminal appellate lawyers will tell you that there is no 
such thing as a perfect criminal trial record. As demonstration cases 
flooded the Court, this axiom was repeatedly demonstrated as 
Justices searched for ways to exonerate members of an increasingly 
popular, nonviolent human rights movement without reaching the 
fundamental questions of constitutional authority that civil rights 
lawyers—and Justice Douglas—repeatedly pressed.  
The second case involved a Trailways bus passenger convicted of 
trespass for seeking service in a part of the bus terminal designated 
for whites only.170 Thurgood Marshall argued for the demonstrators 
as director of the premier civil rights litigation unit that was to 
become the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.171 This is 
especially significant, for Marshall would later rejoin the Court’s 
discourse on federal power as Solicitor General arguing similar issues 
                                                                                                                                       
 
of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963); Edwards 
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962); 
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960).  
 168. Notice that the “crime” occurred before, but the ultimate appeal was decided 
after, Brown v. Board of Education and cases decided in its wake, which outlawed race 
segregation of public facilities.   
 169. Wolfe, 364 U.S. at 180, 194–96 (1960). A federal court had held that the 
course unlawfully discriminated against black people, but a jury had found that the 
protesters were not excluded because of their race. Wolfe, 364 U.S. at 180–81. There 
was a dispute as to whether the record of the federal case was offered in evidence in 
the state criminal proceedings. Wolfe, 364 U.S. at 183. The majority found no 
constitutional error in the state supreme court’s affirmance of the conviction. Wolfe, 
364 U.S. at 194–96. 
 170. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 455 (1960). 
 171. Id. at 454; see Julius L. Chambers, Thurgood Marshall’s Legacy, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 1249, 1252 (1992) (“The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund was 
created in 1939 and incorporated in 1940, largely by Thurgood, as a separate 
organization from the NAACP. . . . As head of LDF, Thurgood was responsible for 
coordinating the entire legal program and the specific litigation strategies of LDF and 
the NAACP.”).  
334 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84.301 
 
for the United States (and still later, of course, as a Justice).172 
Marshall and his colleagues sought a constitutional ruling that the 
denial of service violated the Fourteenth Amendment.173 A 
comfortable majority of the Court chose not to reach the constitutional 
question, but took the unusual step of reversing the conviction on a 
ground not raised by the protesters.174 Pioneering a practice of 
resorting to Federal Commerce Clause powers rather than grappling 
with the meaning of constitutional personhood, seven Justices held 
the conviction invalid because the denial of service was in the course 
of interstate travel and therefore violated anti-discrimination 
provisions of the Federal Interstate Commerce Act.175  
Garner v. Louisiana, a sit-in case involving a sit-in demonstration 
that resulted in convictions for disturbing the peace, was the first of 
the 1960s protest cases in which the justices disagreed publically 
about core civil rights and federalism principles.176 The 
demonstrators, once again represented by Thurgood Marshall’s civil 
rights litigation unit,177 had sought to enact, to call attention to, and 
to establish as a matter of constitutional law, their right to be 
accommodated in public spaces.178 This time, every justice voted in 
favor of the protesters. A majority (including Justice Frankfurter179) 
avoided the constitutional issues by voting to vacate the 
demonstrators’ convictions on the ground that there was no evidence 
that the peace of the Louisiana community in which the sit-in 
occurred was disturbed or was likely to be disturbed.180  
Justices Douglas thought any fool could see, and any judge might 
rightfully take judicial notice, that public, integrated dining would 
disturb the peace of downtown Baton Rouge, Louisiana in the 1960s, 
and he squarely confronted the question the demonstrators had 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 172. For an overview of Marshall’s civil rights advocacy before the court as 
solicitor general see Russell Moss, Marshall’s Battles Before the Bench, 1 HOW. SCROLL 
SOC. JUST. REV. 148, 158-61 (1993).    
 173. Boynton, 364 U.S. at 457. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 463–64. 
 176. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961). 
 177. The case was argued by Jack Greenberg, with William Coleman, James 
Nabritt, III, and Louis Pollak on the brief. All were counsel at and for the Legal 
Defense Fund. See Brief for Petitioners at 38, Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) 
(No. 26).  
 178. See Garner, 368 U.S. at 160–63. 
 179. Id. at 174. Justice Frankfurter concurred separately to emphasize that “the 
whole question on the answer to which the validity of these convictions turns” was 
whether “the ‘public’ tended to be alarmed by the conduct of the petitioners” and that 
no attempt had been made to prove it. Garner, 368 U.S. at 175. 
 180. Id. at 163–64. 
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wanted to pose. In bold and controversial181 terms, Douglas laid out 
an inclusive definition of the public sphere. He relied on language 
from the Civil Rights Cases182 to argue that State action included not 
only the enforcement of State laws but also the enforcement of local 
customs. Pointing to a long and wide-ranging183 list of Louisiana laws 
requiring race segregation, he concluded that segregation was so 
much a part of the policies and customs of the State of Louisiana that 
the state was complicit even when it enforced a policy of segregation 
that happened not to be officially mandated.184 Looking to tort and 
administrative law precedents, Douglas found ample authority for 
inhibiting a proprietor’s choices about how to run a business. Drawing 
a connection to New Deal legislation that permissibly regulated 
“private” businesses in order to promote social welfare, he argued that 
a state’s regulation of establishments serving the public made the 
state complicit when it permitted and enforced a regulated business 
establishment’s voluntary segregation policies.185  
In language that seemed responsive to the Movement’s claim to be 
the voice of the People, Douglas sounded a People’s narrative. After 
pointing out that “[t]he authority to license a business for public use 
is derived from the public” he reminded his readers that “Negroes are 
as much a part of that public as are whites.”186 Having oriented his 
account to protection of people’s rights as a steady state, Douglas 
renewed Harlan challenge that the Court take on the work of 
understanding what a post-slavery, classless society would look like 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 181. See Kenneth L. Karst & William W. Van Alstyne, Comment, Sit-Ins and State 
Action—Mr. Justice Douglas, Concurring, 14 STAN. L. REV. 762, 765–68 (1962) 
(explaining that Justice Douglas believed “custom, observed by parallel private 
decisions and uncoerced by state police or state laws,” was sufficient to qualify as State 
action). 
 182. Garner, 368 U.S. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[C]ivil rights, such as are 
guaranteed by the constitution against state aggression, cannot be impaired by the 
wrongful acts of individual, unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, 
customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.” (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3, 17 (1883))) (emphasis in original).  
 183. Common carriers of passengers had to provide separate waiting rooms and 
reception room facilities for the two races. LA. REV. STAT. §45:1303 (West 1960) 
(repealed 1972); Louisiana required that all circuses or tent exhibitions to which the 
public was invited must have separate entrances for separate races. LA. REV. STAT. § 
4:5 (West 1950) (repealed 1975); No dancing, social functions, entertainment, athletic 
training, games, sports, contests “and other such activities involving personal and 
social contacts” were open to both races. LA. REV. STAT. § 4:451 (West 1960) (repealed 
1972). 
 184. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 181 (1961). 
 185. Id. at 184–85. 
 186. Id. at 184. 
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and debating whether—or to what extent—the United States was 
constitutionally committed to being such a society.187 And with this, 
he opened a Pandora’s Box of new questions about federal power: This 
time the question was not whether the federal government could 
prosecute individuals, rather than states, for civil rights violations, 
but whether private persons could discriminate on racial grounds in 
their privately owned businesses and count on the state to enforce 
their exclusionary commands. 
As protesters were repeatedly arrested and convicted, 
demonstration cases proliferated in the Supreme Court. On a single 
day in 1963, the Court decided six of them.188 Justice Frankfurter had 
resigned and been replaced by Arthur Goldberg, who promptly joined 
Justice Douglas’s broodings about state action and people’s rights.189 
The six civil rights cases decided on May 20, 1963 were all decided in 
favor of the demonstrators; all convictions were vacated. Eight 
justices voted in every one either to vacate or to remand for further 
proceedings.190 Peterson, chosen as the lead case, was briefed and 
argued for the demonstrators by NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
attorneys191 who led with a claim that public accommodation is a 
federally protected right, even when the decision to segregate is made 
by the accommodation’s private proprietors.192 Once again, the Court 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 187. Id. at 185 (“As the first Mr. Justice Harlan stated in dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, . . . in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country 
no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution 
is color-blind.”).  
 188. See generally Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); 
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 
U.S. 267 (1963); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 
373 U.S. 374 (1963); Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963).  
 189. David M. Levitan, The Effect of the Appointment of a Supreme Court Justice, 
28 U. TOL. L. REV. 37, 60–63 (1996) (discussing the impact of Justice Frankfurter’s 
resignation on civil rights cases).  
 190. Peterson, 373 U.S. 244 (unanimous decision) (Warren, C.J., opinion) rev’g 122 
S.E.2d 826 (S.C. 1961); Shuttlesworth, 373 U.S. 262 (7–1 decision) (Warren, C.J., 
majority opinion), rev’g 134 So. 2d 215 (Ala. Ct. App. 1961), and 134 So. 2d 213 (Ala. 
Ct. App. 1961); Lombard, 373 U.S. 267 (7–1 decision) (Warren, C.J., majority opinion), 
rev’g 132 So. 2d 860 (La. 1961); Wright, 373 U.S. 284 (unanimous decision) (Warren, 
C.J., opinion), rev’g 122 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. 1961); Gober, 373 U.S. 374 (per curiam), vac’g 
133 So. 2d 697 (Ala. Ct. App. 1961); Avent, 373 U.S. 375 (per curiam), vac’g 118 S.E.2d 
47 (N.C. 1961). 
 191. Matthew J. Perry, then Chief Counsel for the South Carolina Conference of 
the NAACP, served as counsel for the demonstrators in Peterson. See 
http://www.columbiabusinessmonthly.com/View-
Article/ArticleID/1224/Remembering-Judge-Matthew-J-Perry.aspx  
 192. See Peterson, 373 U.S. at 247 (noting that the petitoners’ argument was based 
on the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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ruled in favor of the individual defendants, but failed to address the 
People’s claim of right.193 No defense of the People’s narrative was 
voiced. To the contrary, Justice Harlan II, took up Justice 
Frankfurter’s baton, not to the full symphony of restricting the reach 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to what Slaughterhouse set off as 
uniquely federal rights, but to the tune of insisting that federal 
enforcement of civil rights had to be limited to proceedings against the 
states.194 In doing so, he sounded the Confederate narrative: 
“[I]nherent in the concept of state action are values of federalism, a 
recognition that there are areas of private rights upon which federal 
power should not lay a heavy hand and which should properly be left 
to the more precise instruments of local authority.”195 
Five months after the Court announced its decisions in Peterson, 
et al., it heard arguments in two other sit-in cases. Eight months later, 
it brought these two cases to a conclusion, ducking once again the 
question whether there is a constitutional right of public 
accommodation and remanding each case to state courts for 
reconsideration in light of anti-discrimination laws passed after the 
sit-ins had occurred.196 Justice Douglas seemed infuriated by the 
Court’s failure to reach the constitutional question presented by the 
cases, and he had gained allies: Chief Justice Earl Warren (who, like 
Douglas, had voted in the past to duck the constitutional question) 
and Justice Goldberg (who had replaced Justice Frankfurter) adopted 
Douglas’s view on the right to public accommodation.197 In words that 
gave a sense of the tenor of the time, Douglas asserted that “[t]he 
whole nation has to face the issue” of public accommodation:  
 
Congress is conscientiously considering it [in deliberations 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 193. See, e.g., Lombard, 373 U.S. at 271–74 (reversing based on the presence of 
State action, not an individual right to public accommodation). 
 194. Justice John Marshal Harlan II would have remanded all but one of the cases 
for closer inquiry into the role played by local authority and whether the various 
proprietors acted under official compulsion. Peterson, 373 U.S. at 250–61 (Harlan II, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 195. Id. at 250. The majority assumed a State action requirement and found that 
it was, or could have been, met by local segregation ordinances or, in one case, by a 
sheriff’s announcement. See Peterson, 373 U.S. at 246–48 (relying on an ordinance to 
satisfy the State action requirement); Shuttlesworth, 373 U.S. at 264–65 (relying on a 
trespass ordinance to satisfy State action requirement); Lombard, 373 U.S. at 273–74 
(equating a sheriff and other city official’s pro-segregation statements to State action). 
 196. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 239–42 (1964). 
 197. See id. at 286 (Goldberg, J., concurring with Warren, C.J., joining) (“I am 
impelled to state the reasons for my conviction that the Constitution guarantees to all 
Americans the right to be treated as equal members of the community with respect to 
public accommodations.”). 
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over what was to be enacted, eleven days later, as the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964]; some municipalities have had to make it 
their first order of concern; law enforcement officials are 
deeply implicated, North as well as South; the question is at 
the root of demonstrations, unrest, riots, and violence in 
various areas. The issue in other words consumes the public 
attention. Yet we stand mute. . . .198 
 
Douglas then made his position on the core constitutional question 
crystal clear, and in doing so made the strongest assertion he had 
made yet with respect to federal power to protect civil rights. Once 
again echoing the People’s claim of national right, he grounded his 
position by saying: “We deal here with incidents of national 
citizenship.”199 Reviewing the arguments he had made in Garner, he 
concluded that whether the American version of apartheid was 
mandated, enforced, or simply tolerated by the state, it violated the 
People’s rights that were solidified by the Reconstruction 
Amendments.  
 
C.  Confronting A Sharper Cry for Civil Rights Enforcement 
Months after the decision in Bell, Robert Moses and his colleagues 
were struggling to discover ways to call the nation’s attention to 
Southern terrorism. When asked about Freedom Summer 1964, 
Robert Moses often says that three supremacist murders and the 
failures of Mississippi and Federal officials to bring the murderers to 
justice persuaded young people in the Movement that it was necessary 
and right to call a group of college students to Mississippi and force 
the country to “look at itself.” Violence against black civil rights 
workers in Mississippi was routine and officially tolerated.200 Drastic 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 198. Id. at 243 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 199. Id. at 249. 
 200. Moses knew this from personal experience. After he was beaten by a sheriff’s 
nephew, a local jury acquitted the sheriff’s nephew. Steven F. Lawson, Prelude to the 
Voting Rights Act: The Suffrage Crusade, 1962-1965, 57 S. C. L. REV. 889, 894 (2006). 
Things got worse. Voter registration activist Herbert Lee was shot dead by Eugene 
Hurst, a member of the Mississippi legislature. W. William Hodes, Lord Brougham, 
the Dream Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1075, 
1097 n.57 (1996). Hurst said that Lee had a tire iron. Local officials pressured Lewis 
Allen, a black man who had witnessed the killing, to testify before a local grand jury 
that Lee did have a tire iron. John Doar, Essay, The Work of the Civil Rights Division 
in Enforcing Voting Rights Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, 25 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997). Federal Justice Department officials said they could do nothing. 
Two years later, on New Year’s Eve, 1964, Louis Allen, who had admitted to federal 
2017]     THE CONFEDERATE NARRATIVE 339 
 
measures were needed if the Movement was not to be snuffed out by 
terror.  
The drastic measure chosen was Freedom Summer 1964. 
Hundreds of young people from across the country joined a 
demonstration of multi-racial citizenship to claim, as People of the 
United States, the rights of public accommodation and political 
participation. They trained in the Spring of 1964 to become non-
violent protesters, voter registration coaches and teachers in 
“Freedom Schools” and then traveled to Mississippi to live and work 
during the summer in sharecropper communities in enactments of 
multi-racial democracy.  
As Moses had predicted, Freedom Summer became a public 
spectacle, and what the country saw when it “looked at itself” were 
the terrorist murders of yet another young black civil rights worker 
and—alas, more compellingly to the nation as a whole—two white 
college students who were volunteers in the Freedom Summer project. 
The terrorist murders of James Cheney, Robert Goodman, and 
Michael Schwerner were barely addressed at the time in the 
Mississippi Court system.201 Justice Department attempts to 
prosecute fifteen alleged lynch mob members, three of them law 
                                                                                                                                       
 
officials that he saw no tire iron, was also murdered. Hodes, supra, at 1097 n. 57. There 
was no state or federal prosecution. There followed the assassination of Medgar Evers, 
one of Mississippi’s most prominent civil rights leaders, by a member of the White 
Citizens’ Council. There was no state or federal prosecution. The Civil Rights Legacy 
of Medgar Evers, NPR: NEWS & NOTES (June 13, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story /story.php?storyId=4700724.  
 201. The political and law enforcement climate in Neshoba County, the county in 
which the civil rights workers were murdered, is suggested by this account of a 1966 
demonstration that Martin Luther King, Jr. led at the county courthouse on the second 
anniversary of the murders: 
 
A large man dressed in a cowboy hat, sunglasses and a short-sleeved uniform 
met King at the two-story red-brick courthouse. It was Deputy Cecil Price. 
Price said, “You can't come up these steps.” “Oh, yes,” King replied. “You’re 
the one who had Schwerner and the other fellows in jail.” “Yes, sir,” Price 
answered. King tried to address the crowd above the loud jeers of white 
onlookers. “In this county, Andrew Goodman, James Chaney, and Michael 
Schwerner were brutally murdered. I believe the murderers are somewhere 
around me at this moment.” “You’re damn right—they're right behind you,” 
muttered the Deputy. 
 
Douglas O. Linder, Bending Toward Justice: John Doar and the “Mississippi Burning” 
Trial, 72 MISS. L.J. 731, 754–55 (2002). One of the killers was convicted of murder in 
a Mississippi court, but not until 2005. Former Klansman Found Guilty of 
Manslaughter, CNN (Jun. 22, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/21/ 
mississippi.killings/. The remaining suspects in the murders have never been charged. 
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enforcement officers, came to the Supreme Court on interim appeal in 
1966 in United States v. Price.202 The murders of Goodman, Cheney 
and Schwerner were still matters of public consciousness; indeed, the 
Government’s oral argument, made by Thurgood Marshall, then 
serving as Solicitor General, began by pointing out that the case was 
known throughout the world.203  
As it had in the Williams cases and in the cases that clustered 
around Garner and Peterson, the Court debated a burning 
constitutional question in more than one instantiation. United States 
v. Price was argued and decided with United States v. Guest. As it had 
done with respect to the issue of public accommodation in Garner and 
Peterson, the Court found ways to duck the crucial question that the 
cases raised.  
While Price dealt with Mississippi supremacist terrorism, Guest 
dealt with supremacist terrorism in Georgia. Three African-American 
army reserve officers were fired on by Klansmen in 1964 as they were 
driving on a Georgia highway from a summer assignment at Fort 
Benning.204 One of the officers, Lemuel Penn, a 48-year-old decorated 
World War II veteran and assistant school superintendent in the 
District of Columbia, was shot dead.205 Predictably, no state 
conviction ensued; two of the assailants were charged but acquitted. 
Although no officer or employee of the State was involved in the 
shooting, the Justice Department charged the Klansmen under 
reenacted portions of the Force Act.206 All of the indictments were 
dismissed in their entirety by a District Court judge who relied in part 
on Williams II to hold that the conspiracy provision did not reach 
private actions to deny Fourteenth Amendment rights.207  
Thurgood Marshall had chosen these Georgia and Mississippi 
terrorism cases to be his first arguments as Solicitor General. They 
were heard on the same day. Having urged, without success, as a civil 
rights lawyer that access to privately owned public accommodations 
is an entitlement of United States citizenship, Marshall argued in 
Guest that private conspiracies to keep people from enjoying access to 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 202. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 789 (1966). 
 203. Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966), 
(Nos. 59 & 60). 
 204. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 747 n.1 (1966) (listing the criminal 
charges against the defendants). 
 205. See United States v. Guest, 246 F. Supp. 475, 487 (M.D. Ga. 1964), rev’d 383 
U.S. 745 (1965) (“[T]wo of the defendants, Sims and Myers, have already been 
prosecuted . . . for the murder of Lemuel A. Penn and by a jury found not guilty.”). 
 206. Guest, 383 U.S. at 746–47. 
 207. Guest, 246 F. Supp. at 478–86. The District Court also held that, if the Klan 
Act remnant did reach private action, it was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 486–87.  
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public accommodations are prosecutable by the United States, at least 
insofar as the facilities are provided by a state. This strategic 
concession was possible because the Government had charged the 
Guest defendants with conspiring and acting for the purpose of 
denying people of African descent equal use of roads, highways and 
other public facilities. The Court did not take the bait; Marshall’s 
attempt to extend the government’s authority at least to private 
action that interfered with the enjoyment of public benefits or 
facilities failed.208 As in the enactment cases, the Court found itself in 
these enforcement cases unable to make a majority statement that 
significantly broadened the scope of federal power to protect civil 
rights.209  
Since our method is to focus on competing strands of judicial 
brooding rather than on case outcome alone, we need not end the story 
of the 1960s cases with a report of failure to put a significant dent in 
the state action doctrine. Thurgood Marshall planted, and Justice 
Fortas hid away in the Price majority opinion, a time bomb of 
historical material that squarely challenges the Confederate 
narrative and its underlying premises. This material may one day 
permit a more people-focused approach to the question of federal civil 
rights enforcement power. 
But for the very public drama of the Mississippi murders, the 
Court’s opinion in Price might be regarded as unremarkable. Eighteen 
people, three of them law enforcement officers, had been charged with 
violating and conspiring to violate the provisions of Sections 241 and 
242 of Title 18 of the United States Code.210 The district court had 
sustained all of the indictments under the general conspiracy statute, 
but it had relied on Williams I to dismiss the indictments under the 
substantive provisions as to the fifteen defendants who were not State 
officials.211 The allegations were that the abductions and murders of 
the civil rights workers were coordinated from start to finish in 
collaboration with the law enforcement officers and with their active 
participation and that the officers had acted in their official 
capacities.212 Indeed, the extent of official participation was at least 
as great, if not greater, than it had been in the Williams cases. But 
the private defendants relied on Justice Frankfurter’s four-person 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 208. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 806 (1966) (noting that the Court’s 
decision was based on the traditional state action requirement and did not raise 
“fundamental questions of federal-state relationships”).  
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 790.  
 211. Id. at 791–93. 
 212. Id. at 790. 
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concurrence in Williams I, and on Justice Harlan’s echo of that 
concurrence in Peterson, to argue that the conspiracy statute could not 
reach them. They argued, that is, that Section 241, the conspiracy 
statute, had limitations analogous to those that the Court in 
Slaughterhouse held the Fourteenth Amendment itself to have: It 
applied to private individuals’ conspiracies only when the 
conspirators’ intent was to deprive someone of a uniquely federal 
right. Speaking in the terms of the Confederate narrative, with steady 
state control at risk of disruption by federal meddling, they argued 
that the statute did not apply in ways that would usurp or discourage 
state civil rights and criminal justice enforcement.  
The Price Court seemed reasonably unified on the surface. Justice 
Fortas wrote for the Court, and there was only one brief concurrence 
(by Justice Black to distance himself from the Court’s reliance on 
Williams II).213 In its second paragraph, the Court denied that it was 
making constitutional law. The issue, it said, was simply one of 
statutory construction.214 Still, in its next sentence it declared 
(ambiguously, we think) that it had no doubt of Congressional power 
to enforce by criminal sanction “every right guaranteed by the Due 
Process clause.”215 Reasoning that private persons who engage with 
state officials in prohibited conduct are acting “under color” of law for 
purposes of the conspiracy statute, the opinion easily concluded that 
the indictments should not have failed as against the fifteen private 
citizens by virtue of their status.216 In addressing the Williams I 
“uniquely federal right” limitation of the conspiracy statute, the Court 
relied on legislative history to hold—as a matter of statutory 
interpretation rather than as a matter of federal power—that 
Congress had intended to reach exactly the kind of private, Klan 
terrorism in which the defendants allegedly engaged.217 Frankfurter’s 
Slaughterhouse strategy of draining the federal government of power 
to address basic civil rights was put to sleep, if not to final rest. 
The Court’s reluctance to face questions of federal power is equally 
clear in the arguments and opinions in United States v. Guest. Guest, 
like, other anti-terrorism cases we have reviewed, was resolved on the 
basis of technicalities. The Guest and Price cases differed in that none 
of the Guest respondents was a public official. Marshall attempted to 
finesse this difficulty by creating a passive link to the state: he argued 
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that the defendants were interfering with the victims’ access to roads, 
highways, and other public facilities that the state was required under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to make available regardless of race. 
Their actions therefore interfered with the state’s Fourteenth 
Amendment obligation of equal protection even though the state was, 
as Marshall put it in oral argument, doing its constitutional duty.218 
The Court declined to expand state action doctrine in this way; it 
instead found a claim of state action in the allegation of a plot to have 
African-Americans falsely charged with crimes and suggested that 
proof at trial might establish that law enforcement officials were 
knowingly involved in the false arrest scheme.219 The law regarding 
the necessity of state action was left untouched.220  
Taken as a whole, the three opinions filed in Guest are a tangle of 
disagreement. Only Justice Clark joined Justice Stewart’s opinion in 
full, and the Justices were unable to agree as to what the opinion 
actually held. Justice Harlan joined the Stewart opinion, but 
dissented “to the extent that” the conspiracy statute was being held 
to cover “conspiracies embracing only the actions of private 
persons.”221 Justice Clark wrote separately to deny that the statute 
was being held to cover conspiracies embracing only the actions of 
private persons, a question he said the opinion “clearly” avoided.222 In 
this, he was joined by Justices Black and Fortas. Justice Brennan 
interpreted the Stewart opinion to rule against Marshall’s passive 
link argument and wrote emphatically to say that he could “find no 
principle of federalism nor word of the Constitution” that denies 
Congress power to guarantee civil rights.223 Justice Harlan (II) wrote 
at length to disassociate himself from any part of the Court’s opinion 
that relied on the existence of a federal right against private 
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interference with interstate travel.224 
Careful vote-counting and opinion-comparisons tell us, then, that 
the scope of federal power to define and enforce a federal body of civil 
rights remained unclear after the sit-in and anti-terrorism cases of 
the 1960s. The state action doctrine continued—and continues 
today—to haunt us; the Price opinion repeated, and the Court has 
often repeated, Justice Douglas’s concession in Williams II that “[t]he 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action, 
not against wrongs done by individuals,”225 and the Justices in Price 
were unable to make a unified statement about the reach of federal civil 
rights enforcement power. We remain in doubt about Congressional 
authority to contain separatist insult or supremacist terror. But, as 
we have suggested, the Price opinion contains material that should 
feed further judicial brooding about civil rights and federal power. 
Between the lines of Justice Fortas’s rather inconclusive Price 
opinion lie historical insights and doctrinal themes that problematize the 
Confederate narrative of states’ rights. The Justice orients his readers to 
Reconstruction rather than to 1787, framing the conspiracy and 
substantive civil rights statutes as having “come to us from 
Reconstruction days, the period in our history which also produced the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution.”226 Citing Justice Holmes in a voting rights case for the 
proposition that the section applies to “all Federal rights,” Fortas calls 
to mind the context of Southern terrorism: 
 
The source of this section in the doings of the Ku Klux and the 
like is obvious and acts of violence obviously were in the mind 
of Congress. Naturally Congress put forth all its powers. . . . 
[T]his section dealt with Federal rights and with all Federal 
rights, and protected them in the lump . . . . [It should not be 
construed so] as to deprive citizens of the United States of the 
general protection which on its face § 19 [now § 241] most 
reasonably affords.227 
 
Having turned readers’ attention in this case of Klan violence to the 
Klan terrorism of the Reconstruction era, Fortas offered a brief history 
of southern violence in the years before the conspiracy statute was 
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passed. This history frames presentation of “the only statement 
explanatory of § 241 in the recorded congressional proceedings relative 
to its enactment.”228  
The statement, which had, ironically, been relied on by Justice 
Frankfurter to very different ends in Williams I,229 was cited in the 
government’s brief, appended in full to the brief and addressed 
repeatedly in Marshall’s oral argument. It made clear that Senator Pool 
of North Carolina, sponsor of the conspiracy statute, intended that it 
extend beyond protection of uniquely Federal rights. But it did much 
more: It repeatedly made clear Pool’s intention that the statute would 
protect against the private violence of Klansmen and their ilk, and 
Justice Brennan, writing separately in Guest, relied upon it to establish 
just that point.230 
Senator Pool and his speech merit more attention than they have 
received. The lack of attention is interesting in itself. Although the 
meaning and reach of the conspiracy statute have been actively 
litigated,231 and although a majority of the Court accepted Marshall’s 
description of the speech as the “only” thing in the Congressional 
Record that spoke directly to the conspiracy provision’s meaning, and 
despite Justice Fortas’s decision to append the entire speech to the 
Price opinion, the speech has been referenced in only seven subsequent 
federal cases, only four of them opinions at the Supreme Court level.232 
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This lack of attention might signal that Price settled so decisively the 
statute’s meaning that further reference to the speech would be 
superfluous. But what did Price really settle?  
As we have said, it decided that the indictment charging a federally 
proscribed conspiracy on the part of Goodwin, Chaney, and Schwerner’s 
killers alleged sufficient state action. But neither Price nor Price and 
Guest taken together settled the question whether state action was 
required to give the federal government authority to prosecute 
conspiracies or actions to inhibit the exercise of civil rights. Nor did they 
lay to rest decisively the question whether Congress intended to 
exercise—and whether Congress has—the power to protect people’s 
rights that are not “uniquely federal.”  
The full text of Senator Pool’s speech goes directly to both of these 
still unanswered questions. Why did Marshall append the full text of 
the speech to the government’s brief?233 And why did Fortas append the 
full brief to the Court’s opinion, adding a puzzling footnote saying that 
it was appended “only to show that the Senator clearly intended § 241 
to cover Fourteenth Amendment rights.”234 Senator Pool sounds the 
People’s narrative of full federal protection of civil rights and insists on 
the federal government’s power to proceed in doing so against 
individuals as well as against States: 
 
That the United States Government has the right to go into the 
States and enforce the fourteenth and the fifteenth 
amendments is, in my judgment, perfectly clear, by appropriate 
legislation that shall bear upon individuals. . . . I believe that 
the United States has the right, and that it is an incumbent 
duty upon it, to go into the States to enforce the rights of the 
citizens against all who attempt to infringe upon those rights 
when they are recognized and secured by the Constitution of 
the country. If we do not possess that right the danger to the 
liberty of the citizen is great indeed in many parts of this 
Union.235 
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Here we have a post-Civil War vision, not of reform, but of hugely 
consequential reconstruction of the federation that was conceived under 
the proposition that all people are created equal, but designed to preserve 
the freedom of private persons to enslave other human beings. Here we 
have a People’s narrative of national protection of human rights: 
 
I believe that we have a perfect right under the Constitution of 
the United States, not only under these three amendments, but 
under the general scope and features and spirit of the 
Constitution itself, to go into any of these States for the purpose 
of protecting and securing liberty. I admit that when you go 
there for the purpose of restraining liberty, you can go only 
under delegated powers in express terms; but to go into the 
States for the purpose of securing and protecting the liberty of 
the citizen and the rights and immunities of American 
citizenship is in accordance with the spirit and whole object of 
the formation of the Union and the national Government.236 
 
Granted, we are talking about the opinion of one Congressman, 
albeit the sponsor and drafter of important federal antiterrorism 
legislation. But we are not talking about the opinion of a Radical 
Republican. John Pool grew up and resided throughout his life on a 
North Carolina plantation. He was opposed to secession, but not an 
antislavery advocate. He was persistently active in fighting the Klan, 
both with federal force and with state forces. In his heart of hearts, 
Senator Pool may well have preferred that States have full and 
exclusive power to define and protect civil rights. He understood, 
however, the need for change and joined the Republican Party in part 
out of “fear that estates would be confiscated . . . and divided among 
the blacks unless conservative Unionists like himself accepted the 
political changes demanded by Congress and controlled the course of 
reconstruction in the state.”237 
The possibility of Senator Pool’s ambivalence is no justification for 
watering down the meaning of the statutes he sponsored, or of the 
Amendments pursuant to which they were passed. As we have shown, 
there has been a persistent tendency to interpret the Reconstruction 
statutes and Amendments narrowly owing to the fact that they were 
approved in a time of upheaval. But, as Pool’s words reveal, a substantial 
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post-bellum reorganization of federal, state and people power was 
deliberately undertaken and fully comprehended. This reorganization 
meant that where the liberty of the People was threatened, the national 
government had independent authority and responsibility to respond. As 
Pool put it, for the federal government “to go into the States for the 
purpose of securing and protecting the liberty of the citizen and the 
rights and immunities of American citizenship is in accordance with 
the spirit and whole object of the formation of the Union and the 
national Government.”238 
 
III. LOST OPPORTUNITIES: THE CONFEDERATE NARRATIVE IN MODERN 
DOCTRINE 
When we look to cases after Price and Guest, we find a significant 
pattern: we see revivals of the Confederate narrative both within and 
outside the field of civil rights, with mantras to the liberty-enhancing 
function of states’ rights protections prominently repeated. On the 
other hand, we see no direct critique of the Confederate premise that 
the People’s liberty depends primarily on states’ autonomy and little 
trace of the People’s Reconstruction narrative that found voice with the 
revival of Senator Pool’s defense of the Enforcement Act. We do see 
signs of brooding within the Court about the reach of federal power to 
protect civil rights, but that brooding no longer references the People’s 
story of a genuine reconstruction to address the contradictions that 
were inherent in the Founders’ compromise with slavery. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the nearly fifty years 
of Supreme Court federalism jurisprudence since the 1960s. It must 
suffice here to identify significant re-emergences of the Confederate 
narrative and moments of lost opportunity–moments when defense of 
the federal government as a guardian of civil rights lacked the 
persuasive weight of a People’s account of Reconstruction. To that end, 
we discuss four cases: City of Boerne v. Flores, Morrison v. Brzonkala, 
Shelby County v. Holder, and Obergefell v. Hodges.239  
 
A. The Confederate Narrative Surfaces in a Struggle Over the 
Separation of Federal Powers 
City of Boerne must be addressed in any discussion of more recent 
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civil rights doctrine. It established the principle that congressional 
measures authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement 
Clause must be “congruent and proportional” to the injury Congress 
seeks to prevent or remedy.240 We do not address here the fit between 
notions of congruence and proportionality and the analysis of federal 
anti-discrimination measures. For present purposes, we regard Boerne 
as an atypical civil rights case that improbably, but consequentially, 
evoked a revival of the Confederate narrative.  
Boerne involved much congressional and judicial sword-rattling 
and is best understood as a case about the separation of judicial and 
legislative powers. The Court had ruled, in Employment Division v. 
Smith,241 that a State could deny unemployment benefits to an 
employee who had been discharged as a result of having used peyote in 
a religious ceremony. Breaking precedent, the Court found the State’s 
action permissible because its sanction against peyote use was broad 
and neutral, rather than directed specifically at a religious practice.242 
In response, Congress took the combative step of passing a law for the 
explicit purpose of altering the doctrine the Court had announced in 
reaching its result.243 Acting under its Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement powers, Congress legislated a standard of review that the 
Smith Court had expressly rejected. In what it called the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Congress decreed that governments’ 
facially neutral laws could not substantially burden the free exercise of 
religion except in furtherance of a compelling interest and through the 
use of minimally drastic means.244  
                                                                                                                                       
 
 240. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
 241. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–90 
(1990). 
 242. Id. 
 243. The legislation announced congressional findings that 
 
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, . . . the Supreme Court virtually 
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious 
exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and (5) the compelling 
interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for 
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior 
governmental interests. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4)–(5) (2000). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s stated 
purposes were: “(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to 
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000). 
 244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2000).  
350 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84.301 
 
RFRA was challenged in City of Boerne245 as too sweeping and 
disproportionate a response to the Congressional mission of securing 
religious freedom. The Court’s response was more elaborate than it 
might have been. The Court devised a facially reasonable 
proportionality and congruence test for determining whether Congress 
had acted more broadly than the risk of constitutional injury warranted 
and applied that test to hold RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the 
states. But it went further. It offered the inessential assertion that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters had considered and rejected a 
proposal to give Congress broad civil rights enforcement powers, 
thereby reviving the Confederate narrative’s call for restraint of federal 
power.246  
In what has become a sharply controverted account of 
Reconstruction politics,247 the opinion describes debate—both on the 
floor of Congress and in the press—concerning the first proposed 
version of the Enforcement Clause. In the course of that debate, 
opponents of the proposed clause complained that it disturbed too much 
the balance of federal and state power. The initially proposed clause 
gave Congress power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the 
several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and 
property.”248 The version ultimately adopted provided that “Congress 
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions 
of this article.”249 Discerning differences between the reach of the first 
proposal and the reach of the adopted Enforcement Clause is a complex 
and indeterminate interpretive task. The Court’s conclusion that the 
adopted clause gave Congress significantly less—or any less—
authority than did the first proposal is at best controversial.250 
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Moreover, it is not clear whether the 1866 debate was about who had 
the authority to define or who had the authority to enforce rights 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s first section: At least some 
who spoke against the first version of the Enforcement Clause spoke or 
voted against the notion that the Federal government should have any 
civil rights enforcement power at all.251 As we will see, the Court’s 
unnecessary and questionable rehashing of Reconstruction history 
foretold a retreat from the vision Marshall and Fortas had offered of 
the power shifts and new constitutional understandings that followed 
on Union victory in the Civil War.  
 
B.  The Confederate Narrative Holds Fast in a Case Involving Gender 
Subordination 
The People’s narrative incorporates a large Fourteenth 
Amendment story of human rights, whereas the Confederate narrative 
incorporates a minimalist Fourteenth Amendment story of freeing 
slaves. In light of this distinction, we would expect the People’s 
narrative to be prominent when groups other than slaves and their 
descendants claimed rights under the Reconstruction Amendments. 
We therefore turn, in this subsection to a case involving women’s rights 
and, in the next, to a case involving sexual minorities.  
Brzonkala,252 a case involving the civil rights of women, was 
decided in the year 2000, but judicial narrowing of federal power had 
been signaled earlier when, in United States v. Lopez, the Court decided 
that Congress lacked the power to prohibit the carrying of guns in 
school zones.253 Lopez was decided under the Commerce Clause, and 
was arguably of little relevance to questions of Federal authority 
pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments, but both the Commerce 
Clause and the Enforcement Clause were relied upon when Congress 
enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),254 the statute at 
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issue in Brzonkala.255 Deciding that VAWA exceeded congressional 
authority when it created a civil action for gender-motivated acts of 
violence, the Court looked to both clauses, and, to the detriment of 
doctrinal precision, Commerce Clause jurisprudence influenced the 
Court’s thinking in both Constitutional contexts.  
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court to invalidate the provision 
of VAWA under which Christy Brzonkala had sought judgment and 
damages for rape, relied principally on Lopez for his Commerce Clause 
analysis.256 In deciding that creation of the civil cause of action on a 
claim of rape exceeded congressional authority, he intoned the 
Confederate narrative’s theme that decentralization of power is the 
People’s best protection against tyranny saying, “the Framers crafted 
the federal system of Government so that the people’s rights would be 
secured by the division of power[,]” 257 and repeated a caution from 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the Lopez case against blurring “the 
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority.”258  
For his analysis of the reach of federal power under the 
Reconstruction Amendments, Rehnquist, speaking for five, announced 
the Court bound by two of its most crippling late nineteenth century 
assaults on federal power to protect civil rights: United States v. Harris 
and the Civil Rights Cases.259 The Rehnquist opinion went on to repeat 
a version of the Confederate narrative: it spoke of limitations placed 
upon congressional power to enforce civil rights that were necessary, 
not because they were explicitly set out in the Amendments, and not 
because of a context-specific assessment that decentralization was 
preferable, but “to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating 
the Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between the States and 
the National Government.”260 The challenged VAWA provision 
consequently fell.261  
Four dissenting Justices questioned the majority’s Enforcement 
Clause reasoning, but stopped short of resolving the Enforcement 
Clause question.262 They distinguished Harris and the Civil Rights 
Cases on the ground that neither involved a federal statute that was 
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explicitly remedial of unconstitutional State actions or failures.263 They 
expressed some comfort with a model in which state and federal powers 
might be used in pursuit of a common goal of protecting the People’s 
liberty,264 but they failed to address the People’s decision in the 1860s to 
alter the Founders’ design and enhance federal power with respect to 
peoples’ rights. The Confederate narrative commanded a majority, and 
the Peoples’ narrative was truncated and muted.  
 
C.  The Confederate Narrative Justifies Voting Rights Retrenchment 
Our account of 1960s civil rights activism and the judicial 
brooding it immediately spawned neglects an important dimension of 
the protesters’ work and their impact on federalism jurisprudence. 
Protecting the franchise was a central goal of Southern civil rights 
activism of the time; voter registration was a central function of the 
young people from across the country who joined Freedom Summer; 
and black political participation was a key target of Southern 
supremacist terror. This activism inspired passage of the 1964 Voting 
Rights Act, prohibiting specified voting practices traditionally used to 
exclude black voters and authorizing the federal government to “pre-
clear” changes in state voting laws or practices to assure that the 
changes were not an impediment to minority voting.265 The law was 
repeatedly challenged and repeatedly upheld in decisions approving 
remedial and prophylactic legislation under Congress’s 
Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority.266 
That pattern changed in 2012 with Shelby County v. Holder. Here 
Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, embellished the Confederate 
narrative, elevating the status of States to both horizontal and 
vertical sovereignty,267 and invalidated the Voting Rights Act’s 
preclearance measures as extraordinary interferences with States’ 
rights of equal sovereign power.268 Four Justices dissented in Shelby 
County. The dissent comprehensively reviewed the Congressional 
record supporting extension of the preclearance formula, prior rulings 
regarding the standard by which Congressional enforcement choices 
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in an earlier voting rights case. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 
U.S. 193, 203 (2009). 
354 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84.301 
 
should be made, and the questionable path to a doctrine of equal 
sovereignty.269 The dissent did not offer, however, the historical 
narrative that supports giving Congress the broad authority it 
exercised when it passed and repeatedly reauthorized the Voting 
Rights Act. In other words, the dissent failed evoke the cruel lesson of 
slavery: that majoritarian political processes can yield results that 
violate the human rights principles that bind us as a nation.  
 
D.  Rights of Sexual Minorities Are Affirmed, but the People’s 
Narrative Goes Unspoken—and the Confederate Narrative Continues 
to Sound 
In a movement reminiscent of extralegal slave marriages270 and of 
civil rights sit-ins of the 1960s, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual 
(LGBT) people formed families, while simultaneously enacting and 
claiming a constitutional right of family union. When the right of their 
families to legal recognition came to the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
the Court did not equivocate as it has done in so many African-American 
civil rights cases It did not resort to technicalities. It relied squarely on 
the People’s right to reasonable autonomy in the formation of families to 
hold that every state must recognize same-sex marriages.271  
Obergefell’s vindication of nationally conferred and nationally 
enforced civil rights was a significant doctrinal move, but the Court’s 
exercise of federal power was not defended, as it might have been, in 
terms of a People’s Reconstruction narrative. Vindication built on a 
People’s Reconstruction narrative was, however, readily available to the 
Court, for the constitutionalization of family rights was an explicit 
objective of the Reconstruction Congress.272 It was well understood that 
the end of slavery would mean the end of deprivations of family integrity 
and autonomy;273 scholars had firmly established that slavery’s denial of 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 269. Shelby Cty., 133 U.S. at 2635–38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 270. COOPER DAVIS, supra note 155, at 30–40, 42–49. 
 271. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015)(“the right to marry is a 
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person”).  
 272. See Brief for Experiential Learning Lab at New York University School of 
Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15–18, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571 & 14-574)..(Obergefell Amicus).  For a 
comprehensive account of congressional acknowledgement during Reconstruction 
Amendment debates that freedom required restoration of family rights, including 
marriage rights, see Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe 
v. Wade, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 299 (1993). 
 273. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 82, 38th Cong. (1864) (“Joint Resolution to encourage 
enlistments and to promote the efficiency of the military forces of the United States.”); 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1180 (1864); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 
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family recognition conferred a civic and social death that was antithetical 
to free citizenship; and even former Confederate states had recognized 
post-Emancipation that the right of marriage recognition was an 
attribute of free citizenship.274  
Although the majority shied away from the People’s Reconstruction 
narrative, dissenters from the Court’s result each relied on the 
Confederate story that the People’s rights are best protected by 
protection of States’ rights. Justice Roberts decried “stealing” 
decisionmaking about same-sex marriage rights from “the People” and 
“from the hands of state voters” and accused the majority of 
accumulating power at “the expense of the people.”275 Justice Scalia 
accused the majority of robbing the People of the liberty to govern 
themselves.276 Justice Thomas charged the majority with “wiping out 
with a stroke of the keyboard the results of the political process in over 
30 States,”277 and Justice Alito accused it of usurping “the constitutional 
right of the people to decide whether to keep or alter the traditional 
understanding of marriage.”278 
The dissenters were correct, of course, in saying that the majority 
had overridden a number of state political processes. This was inevitable 
and right, for the People may legitimately seek to trump both state and 
federal legislative processes. This does not mean that their claim of civil 
                                                                                                                                       
 
64 (1864); CHARLES K. WHIPPLE, THE FAMILY RELATION, AS AFFECTED BY SLAVERY 3, 
9, 11–13 (1858); HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE ANTISLAVERY MEASURES OF THE 
THIRTY-SEVENTH AND THIRTY-EIGHTH UNITED STATES CONGRESSES, 1861–64, at 313–
27 (1864); Amy Dru Stanley, Instead of Waiting for the Thirteenth Amendment: The 
War Power, Slave Marriage, and Inviolate Human Rights, 115 AM. HIST. REV. 732, 
732–33 (2010). 
 274. Upon emancipation, the former Confederate states  recognized that "domestic 
relations of that class of persons who have been recently released from the condition 
of slaves and given the rights and privileges of free persons" was "of great importance." 
McReynolds v. State, 45 Tenn. 18, 20 (1867). In response, they found that, "justice and 
humanity, as well as sound public policy, demanded legislation giving legal sanction, 
as far as possible, to the moral obligations of [former slave marriages], and rendering 
legitimate the offspring thereof." Jennings v. Webb, 8 App. D.C.  43, 54 (1896).  Thus, 
between 1865 and 1870, all eleven states of the former confederacy revised their laws 
to recognize marriage between former slaves.  See Darlene C. Goring, The History of 
Slave Marriage in the United States, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 316 n. 87, 316 n.100, 
324 n.123, 325 n.127, 326 n.131, 331 n.167, 332, 334 n.185, 335 n.193 & 336 n.196 
(2006) (compiling Tennessee (1866), Louisiana (1868) Virginia (1866), South Carolina 
(1865, modified in 1872), North Carolina (1866), Florida (1866), Arkansas (1866), 
Mississippi (1865), and Georgia (1866) statutes respectively); Washington, supra note 
3 (describing Alabama (1865) and Texas (1870) statutes).,  
 275. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612, 2615, 2624–25 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 276. Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 277. Id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 278. Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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and human rights violation disregards political process: their claim 
summons the people’s decision, at moments of constitutional enactment 
or amendment, that majoritarian politics can not be permitted to 
function without limitations based on respect for human rights. Justice 
Kennedy made this point by summoning oft quoted tenets of 
constitutional democracy:  
 
An individual can invoke a right to constitutional protection 
when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees 
and even if the legislature refuses to act. The idea of the 
Constitution “was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal 
principles to be applied by the courts.”279 This is why 
“fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they 
depend on the outcome of no elections.”280  
 
Justice Kennedy’s argument might have been strengthened by 
explicit recognition that the 1787 constitutional order was 
reconstructed for the precise purpose of assuring that fundamental 
rights be understood as supervening principles to be applied by courts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It is a consequential and insufficiently acknowledged part of our 
intellectual history that anti-Federalist ideas about the liberty-
enhancing effects of local control have been used repeatedly to paper 
over the contradiction between slaveholding and other forms of 
subordination on the one hand and equal respect for all people on the 
other. Chief Justice Roberts, author of the Shelby County majority 
opinion and author of the opinion that constitutes one of two 
precedential links to the opinion’s idea of equal sovereignty, has 
played a significant role in the retelling of the Confederate anti-
Federalist narrative and its rationale.  
In the majority opinion upholding a provision of the Affordable 
Care Act in NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts included a wholly 
unnecessary preamble.281 This preamble, not joined by any other 
member of the Court, was ostensibly offered as a statement of 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 279. West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
 280. Id. at 2605–06 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 
638). 
 281. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577–80 (2012). 
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principles governing congressional power to enact a national medical 
care system that sustains itself by making demands on States and on 
the People. The Roberts preamble is an ode to the importance of 
limiting Federal power. It essentially recites what we have called the 
Cruikshank creed: the preamble refers at length to the history of the 
nation’s Founding, but never to its post-bellum Reconstruction; it 
reiterates the Confederate rationale without explanation or 
qualification;282 and it makes no mention of the impressive body of 
scholarly work in the fields of law, decision theory, philosophy and 
political science addressing the circumstances under which 
decentralization of government power is and is not in the interests of 
a principled People.283  
As we have shown, the Confederate Reconstruction narrative of 
modest reform and preservation of States’ rights can easily go 
unchallenged. A highly distinguished historian of Reconstruction 
addressed the legal community in 2012 to point out that the narrative 
of modest reform “remains embedded in the law long after the 
intellectual foundations of that historical outlook have been 
demolished.”284 He argued, and we agree, that a critical reassessment 
of the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the tensions between the 
People’s freedom and States’ autonomy is long overdue.285  
The Court’s willingness to defer to States on fundamental 
questions of dignity sets the United States apart from the growing 
international consensus that the protection of human rights is the 
obligation of every national sovereign, whether composed of federated 
states or not.286 A reassessment of Federal authority to protect the 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 282. See id. at 2578 (“The independent power of the States also serves as a check 
on the power of the Federal Government: ‘By denying any one government complete 
jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the 
individual from arbitrary power.’” (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 
2364 (2011)). 
 283. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free 
State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 
1230-52 (1999); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 181–93 (1998) (discussing state and local governments as 
administrative arms of the federal government). 
 284. Eric Foner, Reconstruction Revisited: The Supreme Court and the History of 
Reconstruction—and Vice-Versa, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1592 (2012). 
 285. Id. at 1585.  
 286. The United States is a signatory to a number of the core international human 
rights instruments, including The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 
195; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, 213 (binding as of Mar. 23, 1976); and The International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 
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people’s rights seemed possible amidst the turmoil of the 1960s when 
the people spoke in the streets to enact freedoms that should have 
been guaranteed in the 1860s. The flicker of the People’s narrative 
that remains from that era should not die. To the end of reviving 
robust argument about the effects of the Reconstruction Amendments 
on the people’s freedom, we offer this beginning analysis and an 
internet site at which one can access relevant cases and other 
authorities and exchange views about the shape of our reconstructed 
republic. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
660 U.N.T.S. 195, 303. These instruments have been ratified by no fewer than one 
hundred and sixty nine nation states in “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.” E.g., International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. at 172. However, in ratifying each 
of these international treaties, the U.S. raised two broad objections that together 
minimize the role of the federal government in protecting human rights. First, in the 
name of state sovereignty the U.S. maintains that it does not necessarily recognize the 
federal government as the primary and final defender on human rights. Thus, the 
ratification statement for each of these conventions states: 
  
[T]he United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented 
by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and 
judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the 
state and local governments; to the extent that state and local governments 
exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take 
measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent 
authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures 
for the fulfillment of the Covenant. 
 
140 Cong. Rec. S7634-02 (daily ed. June 24, 1994); 138 Cong. Rec. S4784-01 (daily ed. 
April 2, 1992); see also 136 Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (similar, but 
not identical, language). Second, the U.S. argues that the substantive provisions of 
international human right norms to which it is a signatory are non-self-executing. 140 
Cong. Rec. S7364-02 (daily ed. June 24, 1994); 138 Cong. Rec. S4782-01 (daily ed. April 
2, 1992); 136 Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). As a practical matter, this 
means that, unless and until Congress enacts specific legislation, the conventions 
themselves do not provide independent grounds for litigants to bring claims in federal 
courts for violations of the terms of the treaties. See Gay J. McDougall, Toward a 
Meaningful International Regime: The Domestic Relevance of International Efforts to 
Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40 HOW. L.J. 571, 588 (1997); see also 
Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 389, 391 (2009) (arguing that, while the U.S. 
typically encourages governments to fully incorporate human rights treaties into 
domestic political and judicial processes, at home we have tended, in the name of state 
sovereignty and other doctrines, to shield ourselves from similarly committing to fully 
accepting international human rights norms as federal obligations). 
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APPENDIX A: GENEALOGY OF RECONSTRUCTION CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS 
 
Although the Supreme Court did strike down many portions of the 
Civil Rights Acts passed during Reconstruction, other portions of 
those Acts remain in effect today. However, those portions have been 
subsequently renamed and renumbered in the United States Code. 
This Appendix traces the path from the original legislation to its 
modern codification. 
 
Section 1 of the Citizenship Act,287 which was reenacted 
verbatim in Section 16 of the 1870 Act,288 remains in effect and has 
been codified as 42 U.S.C. §1981. Today §1981 is understood to ban 
both government and private discrimination in the makings of 
contracts, and reads in its entirety:  
 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by [W]hite 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to 
no other.289  
 
Section 1 of the Citizenship Act and the identical Section 16 of 
the Enforcement Act also produced the modern civil rights 
provision codified as 42 U.S.C. §1982. Section 1982 is fairly self-
explanatory and reads in its entirety:  
 
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in 
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by [W]hite citizens 
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real 
and personal property.290 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 287. Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866). 
 288. Enforcement Act of 1870, Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870). 
 289. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). 
 290. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012). 
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Portions of the Klan Act291 survived as 42 U.S.C. §1983 and now 
reads in relevant part:  
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .292  
 
In modern times, §1983 has become the primary vehicle used by 
private parties to vindicate their constitutional rights against state 
and local government officials. In and of itself, §1983 did not then (and 
does not now) create any new substantive right. Rather, it establishes 
a cause of action in federal court for damages and injunctive relief 
against state and local officials who violate any constitutional or 
statutory federal right. 
 
Sections of the Klan Act also survived as 42 U.S. §1985(3) and 
today read in relevant part: 
 
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go 
in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for 
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any 
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, 
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for 
the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted 
authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing 
to all persons within such State or Territory the equal 
protection of the laws . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in 
this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or 
cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such 
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or 
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or 
privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured 
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages 
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 291. Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871, Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
 292. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
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more of the conspirators.293 
 
At the time of its original passage in 1871, §1985(3) was 
specifically aimed at providing a federal remedy against the Klan and 
other groups who used violence and intimidation to prevent Blacks in 
the South from fully enjoying their freedom. The original provisions 
of what is now referred as §1985(3) contained both criminal penalties 
and civil sanctions for violation of the Act. Shortly after it was 
enacted, the Supreme Court struck down the criminal sanction 
provisions of the statute without addressing the constitutionality of 
its civil penalties. The statute remained dormant until 1940s when it 
was occasionally used to bring civil suits to quell mob violence directed 
toward unpopular political groups. Today §1985(3) remains in effect 
but, as compared to §§ 1981, 1982 and 1983, is rarely the 
determinative in civil rights litigation. 
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APPENDIX B: ONLINE DOCTRINAL MAPS 
 
To see visual representations of this Article’s doctrinal argument, 
please go to our online appendix or follow the individual links below. 
The online appendix includes six interactive maps that chart the 
genealogies of key Supreme Court opinions described in the Article. 
These genealogies link Supreme Court opinions to Reconstruction 
legislation, Constitutional Amendments and historical events. Click 
on any of the depicted opinions, laws, amendments, or events to open 
a new window containing open-source information about the link.  
Sources: Supreme Court opinions are provided by CourtListener 
(a free site that provides verbatim opinion text) and by the Court 
itself. Reconstruction legislation is represented by documents 
gathered through original research. Information about historical 
events and constitutional amendments comes from the open-source 
repository Wikipedia.  
 
Map Description 
Map 1 depicts Part I.A above–The 1787 Order Reconstructed.  
Map 2 visualizes Part I.B above – Early Supreme Court Interpretation: 
the 1787 Constitutional Order Restored. 
Map 3 illustrates Part I.C above–The Competing Interpretation: A New 
Charter of Freedom. 
Map 4 charts Parts II.A-B above– Assigning the “Occasional 
Unpleasant Task” of Civil Rights Enforcement + Protecting the 
Performance of Free Citizenship. 
Map 5 renders Part II.C above–Confronting a Sharper Cry for Civil 
Rights Enforcement. 
Map 6 summarizes Parts III.A-D above–Lost Opportunities: The 
Confederate Narrative in Modern Doctrine. 
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